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* t o  m w t  American people since th* i$?d©, rhis ©insular 
phrese conjures up imaoes of U.S. secret arienr©
'ftbotgi foreign ce|$ 1 taIs ©teaI In# sectpts a n d  V / . v
assass!nat ino f o r * *an leaders, or oavinp a pi inch/ demoted a a e m  
command a s e c r e t , iIleoalIy funded, band of maraudino auerri ila 
warriors in some faraway desert or >unale. However, noth of 
these scenarios could not be further from the truth. U.S, 
covert operations are neither a recent ohenomen $ nor neees s a r 1 Iv 
an evil one. Such operations existed in the times of our 
nation's foundina fat hern. As one expert remarks about toe 
United S t a t e s , 1th i s count ry was created hy violent revolt 
aaa i nst a reoime believed to he tryrannous, and our founatno 
fathers... received aid from fore i qn count r i e s .n c Fa i n » ?8?> 
While some U.S. covert ooerations have indeed been extravagant, 
and at times, iileaal or unethical, most have been rational ana 
purpose f u i opei at inns run by i ntei i j ue n t . ca p a t v i e , - .^ nfi -nefi j ca -fen 
aoents for ethical and morai reasons.
lhat last statement is one whirr, » r n u m e s  inviv ,-Vm *' irtv . 
and it has been the suh*ert ot continued debate for this countrv 
and its leadership. These debates revo:ve on issues such 1s5 the 
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operations, awl tti* existence <st covert cf.er*tlons In * free »o«b • •
’'^tel.■*!%;.' ’■ wI’lh tf«ir oi f|,et'»\ viH^VtiI oft.' W  
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for thi* n**xt forty -the e** years,
! : > 1 The po^f-World War 11 era saw the creat |oh of the C en tral; ^ 5 _: 
Intei 1 l genre Agency ( Cl A >, via the \ 04 7 National Security Act, 
which provided the U.S. wirh the necessary organ i si a t  i on a I 
frame war*', resources, and sanctioned authority rn ac r i ve i v 
conduct many covert operations over the next forty years. it 
was our i no these years that the lj,.s. engaged its nr jnc m a i  
arch-enemies*- Communist ideological ann state spots sore o 
ex pans 1 nn 1 sm . Amer i c.i s \ <101* o u s ) v rna } i enaed these **n*»m * es 
ai oca ) 1 v and »ustifled these engagement s ph i i os'»ph 1 ca 1 1 v ureter.- 
t he ausp i ces of m n  t a i n i no Common i s m , ass i st » no its a \ 1 \ es » 
defending its friends, and protecting * vital'1 American 
Interests. Up until the i ate l^BOs, America, though shaken ny 
excesses and illegalities in its intelligence field, remained 
committed to conducting such covert n p p r n  innru essenr \,». y 
under the same auspices oefore.
However . wniie America he i a fast to 1 t n cover t. oner at ions 
arid its supportive ideology, the world si t oat i.on. c h a n g e d . .
Pr 0 0 1 rffis such h s  world wine tern >r i dm . narcot i cs trade , 
t pchno 1 0 0 1 ca i esp j onaae , and other econom i c t hr ea t s rea-red t ne 11
transformat ion, Communist ideological ana state sponsored 
expansionism appears to have all but halted ail over the worlds
and quite literally, the Communist states stand in ruin oeh i no
their respective curtains of rusted Iron and shattered Bamboo, 
The rnamr sponsors of such expansionism realised that their 
internal structures, ideological philosophies, and very 
existence were collapsing. Their nations ate in setlous 
economic, political, and social upheaval. In addition, the 
mator East-West conflicts appears to have abated. Nations and 
governments ot the world are beginning to turn their attention 
away from the Cold War, and focus it on trie recurring threats 
from the previous decades, along with new problems such as 
” f r i end! v  techno) oal ca * esp i on age . The patent-i a ; of the ilni ted 
States ufiI Irina covert operat ions on these new issues has 
increased, .inn once aoa in, so has the debate on doino so arm
whether or not a new focus requires new standards*
‘ ' V *' - .
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and c U n d e s t  In® activities. Also, it describes the oomraano, 
control and communicat ion structure qovernino u .rs. cnverr
operations.
The second part evaluates the p h i 1osopnicat histifIcation 
of fj.s . covert onerations rounhly from the early American 
oresidents through the late i^fcUs. Questions covering areas such 
as: What was rhe mono of rne oovernrnent »nd hif* nation our »r,n 
each period?? What were the thoughts of Amec ican o f f u n a i s ^ :  
What type ot operations were conducted? and Whv?; and What were 
the changes, over time, in the use or type of covert 
operattons?. will be answered.
The third section examines the future of covert operations
in rne l Q W s . S p e c  i f h.;a M yv i r analyzes what -inn wt eri.» rover r
operations are focuaint on, and then, speculates on how nations 
might utilize such opera t ions more on perpetual .Is s u m ** of trade 
and recnnologlca1 secrets, terrorism, and narcot ics trafficking;
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Th i s p iper spec i t i oa I j y t census on rov»r r nper =, t -( n P ct , » -n
di »r i nou i s h a b 1e from secret and clandestine 
opera t i oos^ activities. The term "secret is a r>rn-=m rno 
inclusive worn simply re ter r i no to act iv t ty comitycteb with; the
i l m i t e d  k n o w le d g e  o f  o t h e r s  < i * e .  , s e c r e t  n e c i o r i , o r s ) i
w h e r e a s , * c 1 andest l ne" refers to secret activity that is 
intended to remain spcret Indefinitely U  ,e. , the names of a 
nation's C c o u n t e r - H ntelligence agents), ciefever. 7 > Both of 
these terms .^ re anp 1 i caol e to "covert" operations sn th^t 
certain asoects of covert operat ions are ootn secret -and l'; 
c  ! p h  . However ♦ o n reference 'to -Ca t eorjr i -^ed opera r • n*




political organizations abroad. and even th* supporting of
> \
m m'mmmStill guerrilla forces are all within the public view. The facet1
= which i s  s e c r e t ,  o r  even c la n d e s t i n e ,  about “c o v e r t “ o p e ra t io n s





cetch-phrase for such U,S, secret Sponsorship of covert, 
operations is “plausible deniadi i i ty“ , which is what, 
distinguishes secret and clandestine activities from covert 
operations. "Plausible denjablIi t y “ specifies that no tangible 
or solid evidence can be traced back to the nation which 
sponsors such operations. "Covert" operations must allow the 
President or other top official to "deny any official 
Involvement without having the lie thrown in h i« face r»v human 
nr documentarv evidence to the contrary," ihpse officia««, an* 
well aw^re that such operations are being conducted} however.
oroner t y cun due ten ('over t operations call (or the officials to 
“sateiv deny*’ any knowledge of them. (Posit2ke, xxxi i - w x :  } ; ) 
Types. Coyect. pp_er.il i.ons
All U.S. covert operations fall into three broad 
categories: \) Psycho!ogiea1 Warfarp. 2 ) Political Action, ann
HfiSiMlil
-t**.-*. <- .
aiiiKia jl»|ga8!glKil8a S M g g
Parami 1 i t ar y Opera t i o n s , The f i rst category oas i ca 1 j y 
includes U.S. secret propaganda campaigns against or in favor of 
a nation that are specifI cally ant i - S o v ie t - ,  anti-regime,
pro-American' West or some combination of the three in n a t u r e .  
The U.S, conducts such operations, either internalty or 
■external jy of the target.' nation, hv , f or ■ evamp.i e , creating - 
radio/' fV ■ st at ions., assist i ng local pup I icat ions or s i m g  i y 
passi no ont propaaandi st mater i. a \ , ail of vvh i oh on tw.u riI y appear 
to be sponsored by i ndigenous persons or groups, c Posi t zfce.
)5 2 >
The main put pose of poi11icaI act i on i s for the. U .S . to 
utilise secret contacts and funao in order to affect tne ■'■■Tt/' 
po) i ricai situation in another nat ion by support 1 no the ev| gt i no 
Government , by assisting the opposition powers-.aga i nsr the'...-;, 
empowered regime, or by subversion. tPosi tzke, 152)
Spe«?i t i ca I ty , U.S, covert; poi i t i cal . act Ion occurs-., i n many forms;;; 
such a s . po 1 it;I c a .1 advice and cou-rise 1 , subs I di.es. to 1 ndi v lduai s ,
11 nanc fat .and techn i ca 1 assist ance t o p o ) * t \cal oart ies, support, 
of or tv ate organ l-z at i ons ( 1 . e . . i a Dor on ions, bus -1 ness 11 rms, 
ann cooperatives>. and private t r a i rri no. of I ridi v{ oua t s . ( fa j n ,
66ft >
The third c a t e g o r y , parami 1 l-t.ary operat ions, contends that 
the ii.S . covert i v suppor t or s.f smu faf e armed re*-;) sr ance „ eI.emers t s'
V*-  ^ Wvviv^  - a*,-X
ir, their Homeland against the regime In power , or to 
‘ irregular troops'1 to invade a country a no unseat i t s .regime. or 
a comblnation of doth, all without direct evidence of U.y, 
par r r et  pat i on . ( Ros I r zr e , i fS£ > I n i t i on . such par am M i r  ar •, 
operations can be used to support f r iend i y nations, pt otect i ,-,g 
i t  from i nt er i or and'o r  ex t er t or threat*'*, a no these oper a" ! or *> 
can ad tune t }y support a }a r ge r war effort as in World War H  t 
Korea , ■ V i e t n a m  and Laos. < Ka i rt. o n h - h h u )
Ana in, a charaoteristie common to a I I three operat j o n a 1 
types is ’plausible deniani rity’M  In each case, the U.S, can
deny participation and no person or nation could unquest ionahly 
■prove otherwise. Another point .is that, a i  l of  these U . 6 . covert
ope r a t  i oii s  a r e  b r o a d ! y p o M r ;  c a  1 ri- a t t empt i ng t o s h a p e  t h e
domest.a c p o w e r  s t  r u e f u r e o f  anot her  na r I  on w 1 t h o u r w 1 f . . . i a f t { j
a r e  n u s t a n )  e x t e n s i o n  0.f d i p l o m a c y  by o t h e r m e a n s . u ■< R o s  1 t . ? x e ,
.LL-S^ -.. cover t |pr.-.3 commafict. auc-can t ,m i J s i  m eluce
Ton a y the CIA. is on i v one of .a on^en in t'ej | ipence 1
whicn -primarily have a fore ion mission, and at is on i y one out 
of a . tot a j f or t y federal a gene i es that cornu r i oe tne so ca M  ed 
intelligence community'1 (See Appendix I >., This community 
currently emp I oys approx i rna f e i v 150,000 people and has >n anrui 1 f 
budget of 13 billion dollars. The primary function served by
i i of is * o prov i ge ; n f e H i a e n ^  for the
National Command Authority (the President. the C a b i n e t , ana rne 
vlnint: 'Chiefs of Staff) and the C o n g r e s s . (J o h n s o n . 38)
U 1 t ifnatpjv, a!! ot the intelligence agencies report, to rne 
Pres 1 den t via his ass 1st an t f nr nati n n a 1 s e c u r 1ty a f fa\ r s , who 
is aiso the chiet of staff for the National Security Coyne: t 
(NSC), The NSC has four st a t u a t or y members. > ncHidi no the 
Pr.es i gen t , vice president , inn the secretaries of defense and 
sr.ite, ana .my other officials that are invi.ren. Encompassed. J n 
the NSC are several subcommittees which are involved in the 
.dec Is ton . mak i. no .process. such' as the. Net Assessment Group v "Which: 
c amp ares Artie r i c an m m  if a r v c a p a o n  ; 1 1 e s with it s a a ve r s a r,.!. e g . 
the V e r * t i r  ati on Pane 1 , which n«« e» >. ■ t o r s other nat ion s * i n»» ; j t ’< 
to certain Intel f igence and milltary executi agreemenfs and- or 
..treaties: the .Nat i ona i Security prancing Or oup c N SPC). , which \ 
rev i ews cover t operation proposals and other significant ■■■.
. act 1. v i t i e s  and h a s  been des j an a r ed d j. t f er t*n t names depend i no one!' 
the admin i st rat 1 on in power and i t s st ruct ure ( i ..e.., , the LO/S 
committee under; Truman, the oa ] C Committee under Eisenhower , the 
Speeiai Group under Kennedy, the 30a Committee under Johnson,
the an Commit tee under Nixon, the eper.at ions Advisory Group
under Ford, and the Spec i a l Coordination Conimi tt>e and Policy 
Pevlew Comm i t tee under Car t er ); and approximateiy twenty-two
i o, * nteraaency groups <SI;Os> which undress various policy 
J ( defense , .econom i e , ana enetay T etr:,), i Johnson , 3^-40 >
■ h^ pi esi dent.. the -.vie?* president, the secret cuy of state, 
1' 1 1nr Of the C 1A , the nresident s o n ;e 4 of s t a f f , the 
president s assistant for nationa1 security affairs, and the 
se c r e t a r y o t defense at t e n d me is ? o f r h e N: spf * 'Tie et i nos . a * n n a 
w ; r h v ar » ous ot her i n v 11 ed o t f s c * a. 1 s . The H l g j e ye i j s 
r en? e s e n  r ho  m* s e n  : or o f  f i c l a i s  ( i ,  e .  , rter>uT v u n d e r  s e c r e t  a r  e s ,
a ss 1 start se c r e t a r i es or e qu 1 v a \ e n t 3 of t r> e Deo a r t me nr** n t M t
3)no 'O t , * he i ,a , t he G H G , and t he 1 n t e : ' i oent re Gorntiiuh * ’ ”
»“»f aft ( {C H ) , The : at ter or qan i za t i orr is nrtaraed with assist 1 na 
in ”rhe rroordi nat i on of the nr nan intei iioenre rornmun i t y • . 
Former R e s i d e n t  Reagan, in June of id8~\ established two 
addition.*; nr nunc t o rncif dm-Jf* nat i on * : s e m e  ity po'irvj vne 
Hen i or Pev j ew (ir oup ( S P G > . to oper ■•» t e as a ran i net - level 
infer aoepev none i t b > r cons mer s j t  m ? i oenoe a>»ri n d  ni.J 
senur rv issues for recommendation to thw NSPG: and rhe Policy 
Pe v ; ew nr oup (PPG). to --upport the SPG as a sen • re 
suo-rani net - j eve 1 i nr pr agency pane j ,f . c Johnson ♦ 4U >
T h e  G s o ,  n s  t r^e k-pv ir iv  j snr  v o u a f a nn 11 ; o«.n ‘ 'mu,? • ♦ y
a f f a i r s .  i s s u e s  some r j  t h e  rod io n  - s  most c o r d  i d e n r  : a ! r e n o r r s  
a n d  aocumen : s  on i n t e i  t 1 d e f in e  pr on n s *  • s  < rr .tde r»»a : n y n y  ♦ he 
t o  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  m  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o r m s :  N a t i o n s 1 S e c u r i t y
4 4M
Count' i i Inre j 1 i oence [) i f er t i ve^ f N B C l Do * .
Dec isi on Mernr»r anoa ( NS [IBs ) , Na t j on a j Mecu r
( N B S M s >. a no Nat lors-i ! Be cur i t y Ar:t:nn Hon n
“ to d - seer et M documents are t he *■ f Qj; n oa t i or«
operat i on s a ri.Kino t he wor I d ■iruj the "
au t hor i t y “ tor f he cite i s I ons triage oy t he n*it £ on a f i eaaer s . 
Propnsa i s t p •< t a e appr overt tare tru> f nrm of NBC Ills, which are 
"broad march i na orders" f rom h i gher author i t • es on irupoi t r^.r 
open at ions, However', the spec ; t • e oper" d  i or, ■? ; r ecu i r emeu t o tor 
c;i i ch a r  ^c t i v i t v a re left f o r the (;; /«, oft i e * a ■ to n a n o ! e . 
(Johnson, un )
Next in the chair: of romnwirt i s the ’director of Centra! 
Intel i i uenee cDCI) wno * ! so h-inpens to r*.e the Hi rector of the 
CI A ( DC IA ) , The air ee t o r i & **P e r; r e a t o rna n a oe r n e affairs of 
the Of At and in addition, nr nj the • chief of the ent t re 
: r« r e I i ioenrre rornrriun i t v . This un i uuf 'two-nats” r- o i e wn > cn the 
at rector pjays has uiw.-ivd been a point of *HOh t er* r m n  i r» fee 
common i r y . The * h a r of DC i has nev*r been con * : nen t : v wnr n oy 
any director: in fact , the other ^aer.cies within the community
have behaved " I ike feudal barons, f ierce*y resistant to stronn 
man a uernen t from the head of the CIA." Nonet h*-i »*<»«_; t the ycl 
maintains command of The N-5** tonal foreign fnte: j u > n r>  Proprarr:. 
wh sen e ncornuasses t he root d . n ft inn .-inti cont t < j •' or t fie en f j re
range of intelligence operations that are conducted by the 
various federal agencies. (.Johnson, 40 and 4 4 )
In the CIA proper, the deputy director of the CIA (DDCfA) . 
who is tne top everyday agency affairs manager, is the neyr in 
command. Below the Office of the Director, which includes the 
Inspector Genera;, the Comptroller, ana other assistino offices 
are the four directorates of operations, science and technology 
Intel I jgence. a no anm in1st r a tI o n . it .s the D .r ec r or a r e of 
Operations (D0 > wnich handles the Clandestine protects and 
covert activities < CA ; of the agency. (-Johnson. 4 i arm 4 4 )
This directorate is headed ny the denuty director for 
operations (DUO) <- See Append!* ?.) , Duly one-* hi'-n uf r he 
directorste's personnel are involved in some type of covert 
activity, while the other two thirds are involved in espionage, 
counterintei 1igence, and liason work with friendly foreign 
na t i oris. The OHO commands five pr i nc i p i e st * t f s wh I ch a nor ess 
areas such as covert action (CAS), counter Intel!tgenre (CIS), 
spec! a : np e r a t ions c SO ) (paraml f It ary), counterterrorism. and 
counternarcotics. In addition to these, the DDO's sixth staff, 
the specialised staff section, maintains the National Collection 
Division < N C D ) I formerly called the Domestic Contact Division), 
which gathers 1n t e 1 \ \aence from foreign visit n r s .nn ny 
debt i ef i ng Arner i can nusi ness travelers i ns i de the fl.s ., ano the
Fore | on Resource Division (FPD^* which attempts to reorujj.
foreigners within the U.S. to be agents. Both of these
Ch v l si o n s . necause of the : r oua i for e i a n • Earnest ■ r ~1('! \ v 1 ? , ^  ^
p drawn heavy criticism from the CIA'*' optionee r s • ( u on r, c,fin
These st a 1 1  s  h ^ v#» cram t er par t-s i n r. eg l on a I di v i s i o «> 
covertng the Soviet .IJn i on/Tast ern. Europe, the Sear * Bur ope ♦
Fast Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. For example, the 
Furonean Division is responsible for ail of the f’iA e» agents and 
officers from Norway to Greece, W! th i rV a par t * c.u | ar country . 
t he head c' I A of f i c i a I i g t he eh 1 ef -of - st a t I on ( CH'» > * bnder 
him/her are the Amer l can case o f  t i cer s < 00) ana the:: indiaenouS
uaentg. ca i I no assets, The duties n( the case officers inriude.
' ooser v i n o , . . g* i n i ng access to, t ecru i t i n q , arid t 1 na i i 7 
nano ling an asset" from some designated t m o e t  . fn addition, 
these officers are capanle of performing more tean ore roie. 
various times, they ruav ro i leer intelligence, p m 1* ; ne 
count er i n r e ! I i genre i n f or rna f i nr . conduct some rvpe or covert 
action, anu/or do a enmo i n a r i on of the three. c.iohnsor , 4o3
The Di rector ate of operat ions provides these Cl A star inns 
with de tailed operating instructions which <tin ve as -»n annual 
"act i vi t biufnr int ." The case officers, ^ m n o  with some 
technical officers, run these :>r»er.n i ons gnr.ier the nirect ior of
At
?'en j n 113 1 a 1 v i s i nr.r? ,j r hiManl 13 r r <-r s . inn 11 no . the U .;j. 
ambassador there, who, in theory, is the superior of the COS. 
(Johnson, 46-4 V )
t n e CAs or the Jo . wher e
e ;iron r;v nln, r per t j s u j v#«r ?• >> i i * . . J s
ana /mil sent to t he lie?. "'hp •  ^r t er r hf*r- or
:>rnve , ey e c u t e an a
CjJ£. |he
* p 0 e r: 0 j > . Th i s
' - -; r r'e OIA Of or ne
1 i  ien covert
he J:: . spec » f .1C ii;j V
s sent *r) 5 h e lS *at e
Ge ■ ■ t* f.4 j 1 ifiij n se :l ♦
* ! ' ■ 1 1 ron:OSS 1 J c ■.
1 t * *./f ir* i 1‘ ( j f jp >: in!;*
f he :)C'i t f >t i
:c g  . wh i oh cend c * ♦ «-*
ft r . 1'he Pr esl -uerIt/'
t he or UfHisaj ! ■
i iHB) f0 r . cost
r. *!f ;v e »■ C C f J
S€* O t
• . ’he re Opi !‘0. 1 V c
1 *C T i r;rev ;■j n h nw : t f\
a t i nn i s  eva ; u.-:> t ed by nf t in i a i s ; 1pe f ; e | a ar a at
h e d a u a r  r e r ^ ,  I n  i s  I s  t h e  g e n e r  a I cnremarirt ana non r r n > s  m  uc t y r e
s n w h  i on u , S . c o v e r  ? oner ar j o p s  ar e nr nr n o p n  . o e v  • * m n  .
! m u  sr ; r* < » v in^nn p m , injfiaren. r^,r ,,.p.o » v-i : n i r ea,
c J o h n s o n  , \ }• n 5
Part II
Ph A. IQ^nnh i.oa ;. ..Jysf.t ; f t Cit. i ons hen i no j  i. s Cover ? i me r * ? r m o
E r  er J  ?ALl
J o v e r t  o h m ( o  i n n s  ar e m o some rmo ? yne n f  i , U  o i i: r m r f a r e
onno ur : "e r?  nv Doom Wnr ; d W.,r { :#1<r; , r n e r , T ho n -iOf* fit
^J,h > et i  ; .1 f h c. , f**u eh no v e r t , ,#r>e r -it 1 or. s  ha v e t* v i a f  ^ n «i j p r*j» -f
birth of inn n o on . It) i e <\ * e • i??:D I e r, * *\n f» * ?* •»!
a c c e n t a n c e  o f  - n v ^ o  o p e r a t  m n s  can be f o u n d  I n  r he s  ; *o y~ f o u r  f  n
b -1 • » n f  p s o e f  oh i f’ h e * t * f' e ^ s e d  t he n e o ;  » m f j^r  ♦ ' t u t  I nf:
to p r o v i d e  The P r ^ i l r n  r n ^  m e a n s  in wh ; rh m  -Jnanarae the 
business n f i ni e i : . derice in seen , mapper o? u o m n .-o m .*y
s u a a e s f  . c P a s  j t :me , x v i  1 , >
A Hdi r j on a • e v 1 de n c e r e \/»» ♦ } r p a t f ot; f : o i n n f o n  e r 0 rie r- ,ami n 
Fr  ^n ■ : r- arxi Thom .10 Jef f e r ^ n  htd h iirn.mtci m m  cfiruj^cr co­
cover * oner a t ions. U u r ;no The pevolut i oner y W a r . Ff oro  ^in uroeo
corn can v, r herrre.it! of’ of 1 «nlnr Fr ench-Amer i can f r o m  
HOPTALEi-.' Company* to secretly channel military a in a no financial 
cis^i^T •* r» t'»-' ft- rne cn i nn i • >r ^  . .jet { ^ r'srv; , our inn fi i rv esioeuuv. 
sanut m n p u  a covert action to replace the Bashaw of rrip o M  with 
a rmt ner r u ! er 'Who vru, i n hr f r 1 end 1 : or to the Uni ten States.
< Jonnson . 1 2~ 1 s > La r er Pres i dent James K . P o U  , said of cover t 
exceed i t u res:
The experience of every nation on earth has demonst r sited 
that emergencies may arise in which it. becomes absolutely 
necessary tor the public safety or the pub i i n g o o n  to make 
expenditures the very object of which wouid be defeated by 
publicity, (posit2ke, xviii>
Kar !y Amer ican statesmen were not alone in their approval 
Of covert activities* for Congress enacted tne first covert 
activities fund ir» 1810 stating that it was necessary for 
“contingent expenses of inter* aurse between the United States 
ana fore ion nations." < Posi t n*e . xviii) These uriner i v
early Americans realisation of the necessity of covert 
operatinns and the*r will i naness tn uti i the such oner at ions in 
achieving certain national goais,
144ft-J 945
Covert operations are relatively sparse on the historical 
record until the 1940s, during World War II, wnen William ,7. 
Donovan created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS 
conducted covert operations globally against tne .Nazis and
*u|€^> *;;sN aq4 Aq paftuJ4UOO put pa;jUJ!{ aq 04 ajan suoi^^ 
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•ftopejrj) * jauo : 4£ jadu qons ue-ict put ionpuoo 04 panu | 4 uoo Auijy 
ay i ou& 4 uauJ4 ^tdaij ay 4 * < OHO> *»uu \ 41 ,iadQ (tloads 40 ao 144Q 
ay ; sat qons &ai4i4ua 114Uauiu laAOb • &• p jaq4U */>6l AJtruaaj 
• 1 ; 4un paapy t :pua jou pip puoi4tJado 4JaAOO uey j jhijj^ • paputqs f u 
i;s*J ay 4 r j Jt# u 1 JOft 40 Pua ay 4 4* qbnoua uaAX  ^;
HSgT-^I'gV
* JtP P { JOtt
* ui pa \ lojqiua sva v»a 4 * 4S pa 4 ! up "aq.4 .£*sn*oau pa ; ■u'lqooaX An©ta: 
put- sno * Aqo a,ja suo t 4* jado 1 too 1 b a&a q4 J04 quo 1 4 to 1 4 t 4&nA ayx 
(HI 'Hi 1 ■'•■AH1 * J« j ) * ta.u ! oa 4 asau ; U 1 sa f 4 -|7i ? 40t,: aooab r j 1 aq y ? ja:| UftOP 
put nut uu i dL:a pa ;onpuuo oq 1e :-;so a.qj/ * suung pue ‘ A • e44 * a 1 ty
aq4 * Atnuup • aou». j* u 1 si a 1 4:1 a i 4**>e- a jv 4 r 1 imv .ltd A | u 1 papfAi PU J 
i»uu|4tjauo 4 jaAuo 40 pauA 4 aqx ‘ <?u i qp put • euuny ♦ adoJf’3 
* utaiJt’ i.la4 s\ u i bpUHOtUiup y 4 m ,a^aU»;'diT
a n o i n cr'iiy a i t; a t ion w i th
(pi! f i, t»” >) ir.e c l A . in
C o v e r  t o p e r a t i o n s  w e r e  f u r t h e r .  l e g i t  i t n i z e a  o >’ Pr e s  t aer it  
T ru m a n  s  i nn i no a NSC a i r e n t  i ve  . fj;fsc - 4 / A , on F ie c e r n w r  ! 4 . i 94 ■ .
Tn i & d i r e o 1 i ve au f hor i z eo the c IA , spec : f i c a ; • V the iU r ect or o f  
Cent r a 1 Intel i i genre < i}C i ) , t o conduct nnv^r' oovrho ■ ntj i r *t : 
e jrer ? t 1 nns eons I sr en t w i r n U , M . on j i ov 
t hr1 {;»■*rj ■*r t ’7,on t • ? w* State *r?ri -le tense, 
r espdnse , created m e  Spec i a * pr r)rpf1'‘rnftn O n  :ut "• ’ ■ h ' r> i t **< tiff ire 
of Spec ^ a ’fper -»f fo n f  u n m o l e  such art i v i f P j‘j , C T  <toof> , 2 8 ) 
Then on June 18. 1*^48. Truman -Jones a?; impor tare 
directive, NSC-in 2 , which iu r hor i rent the Cf A to ent, met covert 
d o  i if :c h | ana pa rami ) it ary oper =*t ions via the Office n t Po ■ t n y 
Coordination c O P C >, The OPC wne 5 a receive noilev direct inn from 
a secret committee chaired r>y the DC I and composed of 
represent atives nt the departments of state ana defense fthe 
10/2 Par.eM. (Fain, f>79 and Prados. 28) N S C- 10 /  2 defined and 
ci iss 1 f lea the to f i owing t ypes nf cover r oper a t ; rn-s which were 
to he oarrien out against the "virions cover r «ct i v i ties of the 
U S S P ’ :
any covert actj v s t » es re? a tea to r  p t op a a a n d a . economic 
wart are: preventive direct action, including nahot ioe. 
ant i —sadot age , oemo 1 i t i on , a n o evacuation me a si * r e s » swdvers i on 
aaa i n tj t hostiie states, i nc j udi nri assistance to unaeror'“hinn 
resistance movements, guerr i i }** and refugee ; ioer at ion arouos 
ana support of indigenous a n t ;-commonist eiomenrs :n r d r e a m e r *  
countries of the free worid, c Posi tz*e * 149)
i n is directive became tne basis of U , S , covert operations
for tne next thirty years and the Presidentiai operations
a p n r o v a ? process developed then stii! exists tndav. During fhir
per i o o , the goals of:■ cover f act Ions were : l) to create a
Pos i t i Df*onr-ifn to hut. id tip and assist an? . onmmun i s f elements! 
2) t-Q- hi* ad. an aggress! ve effort to. weaken the Commun i st s both
inside and ou t s i de of the Soviet orb i t vi ^  tip n i qn inter vent ion
or basic 
Europe 1 1
sudver s i on and 3 > to est a b ) I sh aoen r s with! ft Wester n 
o survi v p a Sov jet i n v as i o n , ha I t it, a n o t ormui^te
resistance groups, These operations reflect a defensive 
attitude ]n nature on the part of the American government, tor 
America was focused on containing the spread of Communism, not 
ey term* nat i no if a I r one t her . (Posit^re. 15? and
Immediately after NSC-i0 /2 , OPC began to conduct various 
covert operations in several countries such as: a g i s t i n g  
political parties in Italy ano throughout Europe to counter 
Soviet efforts CPositrke. I 87 ) , ann beo : n '» «no in ! o.jw (through 
iQ5 4 ) the CFA began infiltrating agents via sea, ?\r , .md land 
into ih e  Sov i et Union for t h e  purpose of sat i of yino intel 1 i oence 
demands from the Pentagon on Soviet mi 1 itary maneuvers, 
equipment, and capability (Posiiske, 20), ar;n lastly, sponsoring 
programs throughout the late 1940s until the early i950s in 
which the U.S. provided advisors, money, material anrj manpower
to resistance groups in Poland, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. in 
add i t ) nr* to these operations, 1 ^ 4 9 c i a i mea the first and last 
■oint Western covert operation to unseat a Communist nation 
w j t M n  the Soviet 1 orr>i t !i w s  conducted a o * ; nst Albania by tne 
U .$. and Br it a i n . I n i s opera t }o n . a !ona with ail of the 
oper-'-t i .’fis ro ‘".^ npiir t e  t i rmmrnun . s! ->ejS f tr n npo, tal ieu
m i ser ao i y *nd each one ended up with 17er*. mune v ana n«.i trr 1 e i 
t ♦. : i nr? into t he ronifi'i j !» 1 • d 0 hand'*., c Poo < r r * «•, 1 oB- S -i)
i
The were the peak per ; on of U.S. covert oner at ions
ana e*’oefi * 1 1 i ry in t one, such act 1 7 ; t ; es oecame the 1 front l 1 ee ‘ 
of I j .S . p o 1 i cy of con t ainmen t c 9 n s i 12 k e , 155 >. D u r 1 no this 
time, r he U .S . v i aourousi y condueten cover t oper a t i ons to 
contain and eliminate the communist threats in various parts of 
the world. By the mid-fifties. American foreign policy had 
become increasingly global, as did the CIA's operations. U.S.
1 n t e 1 1 i oenre f ncused on t. he Sov let Un j on , Ch 1 na . leftist par t 1 es 
-no :e det s in fhe Third World and Europe, tnrouoh an increase 
in covert operations <-» nn .in ex t e n s  I ve network of “ agents of 
m f  ’ s en  r e . 1 ( P n s i t Z K e .  m i  ar.d Fa i r, . oHU-f'Bi)
Tne occurrence of Korean W^r * «n indirect e» feet s on
U.S. intelligence and covert operations. The first was that * he 
‘'hard” nf rr> il i M r  v tar nets focus of the p ^ iom st ] I l retained ito
Mtrnmmm
t hi*
p a r t t o t wo s u D - f  a c t  r
, . m a' i n 1 v po! i t i c  a 1 s n
y - e  i u r t .c ou rit t i e s ,  I
r e u s e  we r »*: )'■ ). d h i t  r:
J 1 , VI yy yU J & i -
r cr> o r ? or i t  i r a t i r^ n in Amer i c a n 1 fit e, 5 i ; genes • Th j s means r n.;i r 
fnr r hr nosr p,rt , ,;t } j nuera t ; nn^ co-inur t ed h an siirni* value r o
* 6 • m i i 1 t ar y ana j t s i n t e M  i gence n e e d s . ( Pos i t ;’vf , \ 0 2 >
Tne ^ectytn VMfi a definite increase < n rover t r;n^ *- at ; on^Y'-k:'
f ne or- . By ] rySd , mu 1 or H , S , 
 f 1 .-I tor e . w p ? h tin i r:u
The suo- factors that. ;^n tr 
y t a f dur i na f he t j r st two vf-*ars 
*'5 + r he 6n tean War. OPC manpower tn',:p from 4 6 ’ tn -66 p*>r so no a nr
:to nudoer- 1 ru'r pmipt f or.ry fold < Amer ! nqer 2uK a no 2 W ): arid 2 >
the Korean War and the Colo War 1 increased trio standi no, and 
influence, of the covert oper-itors w  thirm tne C J A . “ (Fain» 6 H 0 ) 
Thus, these two s u m - fact or v aave the new operators the influence 
and an * is t y to conduct more oner at inns.
Aside from the Korean War, the U.S. government issued 
directives that re* i nen the o n ^ r t  \ ves of w.S. covert; operations 
and the groups wnich Handled such ac t i v }t i e s . Directives such 
as. N3C~5n which in I ° 6 0 onr.so; ictuten npc ,.>nn oMn .• hrr. rnf* 
comti 1 ned Directorate of Plans O D D ?  and emphasised st rengt hen i ng 
contacts with ant i- Soviet grotjps. to K m u i r e  .in-jet rri i ir^rv 
i n for mat 1 on ; ?3b0- H U  1 r; \ 0 5 1 wh 1 r*r> st resseo a more v i anr ous
same y e a r .cover t. a j n pr ngi am to anti common i sr g r o u p s : arm that
< i j R  un i r h  \ * i d ernphuc i s  nn c o v e r  t  n r » e r a t  i n n s  ana l n s *  t h e  
Ch i n e s e . hh, ?u ,-,na h :.?5
An or ner n n  ec t i ve on rovp; t oner ar i on 3 was i ssuen Dv
preo j dent K i senhower on K-i^ch | 5 , ; Q5 4 , ?ir»C -54 c^jlen fnr
onn t i riupri cover t act i v 11 y w i r h n a spec j t i ed r inoe of 
oppf i* ■, on s . and • f out * f neO -c »p n r ova r p f  neur i t  j ?.f* t n f n : * m./,
ih s o t act po j nt c r e a t prj the s o  - c u , l p o  54 j 5 5 ' r ou n  wh f ch war to
f eu . .1 r !
; f) f> o n e ; . ( P r a ano , ! {w  a *; r ?
; ? * f't*
c *
aJ t 7 t i . H . I tMilfM C ( f ? m> '•] V,-‘ f 'i .r t covet * ' jt>t’ * .i t i on-
t n e s r  u s e  , rj o n o e r c c r  Pornrmm j s :  e f  f or r s  t hr o o t n . c  t h e  wor i o .
n 1 e  : t j  e f > f r  * S e n h o w e t  » o , f u r . »? e n  o  t ; mu s .»? ; m i  o u e r "  r i > i .5 p ? ■;
* n ^ u r  t e r t  i o n  a i a c t  1 v i t j p*-r j n rr.a 1 r, a c n  r.n , m  a n o  o r P o p  : p n  .**•>
” - ' U t i v e r **»ve a r t  i v i r i e ;  cm t h 1 r; * r e a*-? n f m >v : r  t con f r o ;  . He a t sr  
o e l i e v e r i  t h e  f u t u r e  r f  c o v e *  t a c t  i n n s  c m f e t o  c o m .ic o c  o n e r  a r m n *  
t h a t  wou ! a  nc  e a  t e s t  r  e s s e s  -in n  s r  r a  i n s ’ w ; t f11 n t. n e  • c  a p t \ v h  
w o r l d ” that would eventually permit such ; captive- cations rn 
Oreafc a wav . < Pns 1 t z *  e , \ 54 )
I’ h e se  c  o n d H o o v e r  (: nr am i s  s  : n n , m e a t  e n tv y K 1 s  e r i n owe r  • n 
l Q b 4 .  p e s t  r e f i p c t a  t h e  moon o f  t h e  o o v e r n m e n t  c w i  m e  t n i j n )  
on c o v e - ? o p e r a t i o n s .  I n i t s  r e p o r t  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  n r q e r t :
ttc* cent j nuen sit■-i i r an 1 lit,- of ,in .;*tirpoc ; •/e c o */er t 
psyoho ■ no i c ^ i . po I i t i ca 1 , a nri nar am 1 i ; t a r •.* f v sian I z t ; nr; rp.or e 
effective, more ur » } que , ann i f  n e c e n s  ar y , mnr e r u t n  \ tnar?
m
m
; aejv ! <k’j; <v 6- j»/ • • 4
r>otonriit of the S n v  iet h i n c .
n * Hi scr  e d : t the prestige anu ideoiooy of Internet i or,.-. *
*"'*vtih.un i **n», . »hd t cmo t he st r e n g t h of its nar t ; es ann other
e l erj ier r s ,
r , c..ou r t e r any r h r ear f > f a p a r f > ur i n n 1 v I at(f, jq o , r err t y r>r 
-v r r ^ n n s i  •.>■> to ('nmrr.un i s? control m  ^*ri>v»» dominant 
nnver ,n  ^ tree w o r *o count r v .
cj- deduce I p r. er ha t icn-H Corn?!;;.* n ; St control nv»*f ^,v ..yeas n* 
t he wnr 1n .
e . St r e*nat hen the or i eri t a r i or»s t ovar d ? n e 'In j t e f-j S‘fate*? nt 
the be no « es and nations n f t he tree worla. accentuate, wherever- 
poss ? o < e , * he i den t * t y of interest between such peoples and
p a .  ! o s  and r h e  United States we i ! as favor I ' h j , where
aonroor ■ Hr*, t hnqp q .-n u p s  , oeru j  i ne ■ y a n v o c a f  \ no tar r>e \ 3 #.»v 3 r*o
t he aov-tr-emenr nf such ^u'u 1 . . n t er est u . . nr-euse * *-e
caoac s t y ano will of such peoples and nations to yes i sr
- r- f ey rf.i T : Oiu. < O i'.iTU'. ;
*• In Hrenr dance w } ♦ r est an • 2 seen on if:.e° . *.d r n t ne 
e -  ■ '■‘ O  pr 1:*! : c  tP  f e  j r, .* r »•«•■♦«••? rinrp : r -1 t e ? ; o r ♦ .*1 r e 1 r » » m n  r r  • 
i ' - i h f  n i t  ion,-*! uommuh ; s/n . d e ve  i or; u n d e r  o? n u n o  f M< ; s f  e .r re  v i n  
t -e: i t 1 t .•» t o rover t are j auer: ,• , ()rM,r o  it;;,.-. ,, ..
V 0 1 t h o s e  f o r c e s  ; n * >^ f» »■* v f*!! f r > *■ w * ? , i n r  ; i n t i  n o
u f* \ ’ r"* -at> ' e  P» (J J ; *■; ; r,j; : i 4 h. i l e  . jOn--' v/n ; $ *n f hf* rr; i , j t  ^ v
t h e s e f o r c e s  3 n t j me o f  \o r w i t h  i r ,  act 1 V e t n e  a t e  f  *q f'j *■
a  s  ■. we ■! i 1 s  1 > j" fa v ; t fe f .) »■• .■; t 1 y - b e h i n d  1s o f»r»;  a n o  e S f . - i p e
f a c  i i i * ; n q , c P r a o o s , 1 |y1 ™. 1i 1 i )
Wj t h this new e v r m s i  ve poi j c. , the CIA ennaoed i n ^nd 
ssionested many "prooresdi v.eM t ypes of prrjqrams such as: 1 > 
assassination of tor elan i natters- This option war- first proposed 
in and subsequently discussed in the White House, senior
official g r o u p s , the NSC. and the Cabinet on whether to enact 
covert measures to extermicate such leaders as Castro. Although 
considered* covert avvaassi nat :rvjT inn*', w ere nr'f nor
conducted nor pianrien fiuring the iusp-q. <Posit:;ke. «-;J
conn f er -■ 1 pswr aency - S u C.p onerat on*: were rnndurrt eo in the
, i O *; > 1 V V
. . . , i n t er na * i on ai <*». t »4; i L- rn i £> r~ 1 s I ,3i cl; * .:"5 V *
r n  '■ i l>V>,L»<; . .  ;; c.; _ . , : . V , . I f - :  : n *
oo’/errtmer. r aga i nsf c-‘Ori-t,T;
f )t rjan  ^11 i t;m  f *r oar am-
( i . e • r he N i * . on a * - a t ti ,
or fit.e« ! r if ! 1:F; <a;sO Srv, . . .*-■’ i -.1 »
eve r y ■■ oa y n e o n le O'
wo r ia . The Se vn ! iinr MPt.,
a n t i - commu n i sr cru sao^,.
r*nn nee tec 3 w i th ! he 0! A ^
cn a il e '"***
 ..
o r t*his Mr no,
f )r u  -i n i .? t t-rio . vh i t
R-j/riP 4 * t <q. ^ r t * r ]e 0 i sc 1 rrr
i t f;* *»■ e , ; h'w : ou > The
1 hp CIA t/f j ' , TO'O • < * ‘ " {... * : ;r*:E J n
> t f (' i • j*t %
de
ij u?’ ours , vh I i ‘h 14Mf! t ? O'
^ f V i r> f ?* f* 1 \
f , , '*»* Pit* .* . U'h ;
• —•ft a r nu nd T v f• oun t e r  oommun i *
, , in rr^
■e 1 r ‘"j * i t or 5’ ■ * ■ ■
, »P - e  n j r e e f  ! y 
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During the i^BOs. the U.S. eonriuet»ui many r n  K 
operations throughout the world. Covert political and 
psycho 1 oa 1 ca ! operations, which were the pr nr-o / o*->er ■*r i . 
types in the l^SOs, were coriducten in Western E*.u ope 
fc*asirr uoa i ot a 11 empt i no t n revive ru i tur' a J or u u p *- n ' t!
(» 8 l
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;.*j At, o u s t  : ‘vfs.i, o n e  o f  r h e  moot  f a m o u s  c o v e r  t p o l i t i c a l
*>0t ‘ ‘ ‘ * n n t ' ° ° h P'ace t rt Iran C Operat i on Af.i:<), 'The ? eso i t o* 
om e r  ; rra  ^r * n _
" '  * 1 Pr o p o p a n d a  a c t  i v ; r  i e s  w a s  t h e  p r e e m p t  ; on o f  a
t - i v e o v e r  i n I r ^  ► .
■ ° fi I'y a n a n  whom t h e  U . . n i n  n o r  t ^ v n r  ,
P r  e ^  ; aer< r r  . 0 .
• nnower , who approved the operation, e . *1 * men the
!:t> f' f.n; PC * i '• „... .
f,'^ >onOf*n <w;:n , t :h 1 0  «:t iri ■ ,-r r-.»* r»‘
f Tje a nr* a or .soviet ent erpc | or* to ecteno j r s
expe:ts and academi a have quest\nned Amer ica s iust »{jcat\on of 
i t s  actions. T h i s  camp claims that rhe U.S,, i n  this p.vt i r u  *r .  
case, confused communism with nationalism. They further 
evidence wh i ch reveals that Mossadeq (the "threat > was a 
nationalist who warded to make nil ownership an issue t someth i no 
the Americans ana especially the British n i o pot u ^ «). /n 
addition, these doubters claim that Mossadeq d\d not recooruxe 
the Tudeh (communist) Party, nut only us inn them * nr their 
support, cpositxke, IBB) So why did the U.s. intervene in Iran? 
Was it to halt the Soviets or iust to eliminate a nentleman who 
threatened American and British economic interests? Most 
experts, like Positzke, believe that the U.S. intervened for the 
latter reason, which raises the moral ethical deoate on whether 
or nor the U.S. shou i d i nvoive itself in this m a n n e r . 
this general debate is addressed In Part IV.
H o w e v e r ,
[.a t ; n A me r t f *  ^ lv a rjri t h e r  r eo i r ! r i t e -t t a t f f . v r  »-*; i ame i ; c
i ’ n v e r t p o l i t i c  a ! 3 C t. i on oner <-» t i n?iS . * n oener >; , t ne rr- t i ot ; t v
f i r>-1.3 . n . s u p o o t  t w r * 1 t yp i CA 1 and t)en i on 1 n n a t u r e  f i , e , , s u p p o r t i
•ifl- j • ■enmnur j y r  d un • i i'.a t i -o p s  . r.; i t r . i:au f. ! no P; ; j • 1 -•. S  , t3 f opoda nr? a
) ( i » ; . > f*
n e r eo i r»r
f^tn, ), Amj t n c u ^ n  on m e  gomest i c affair s threats of f r * e n rs t v
regimes intern*- guer t ; • as i ?; ' * ‘
‘ not : f ! c* -1 jo*- * n»- nve? a t ; ;:, . . n ? e r *. er. ♦ . on
t a* K s Or **■; -» . fjf'iO r\ j i of ; t • 1 » e e o r  n  o * **«,*♦  r* man : r - * ,»»- • ->f * * ; ,*,»■t ; r. *
r e g i o n ,  w a s  Owp ?r> i n c r e a s e d :  : ; .As* , p a s ?  £ ur  nrj^.^n , O . n i r
*nrt cn  i n e s e  a c t  i v j t y , 2 ) a r u  \ -Airier ; c a n  s e p t  i rncnt -  . )
t err or i s m , c Pos i t r * e , ) 8^ - ] ^ 0 >
Esoen t i a M y ,  then, t hr ou uhou t t he I o5i;s, the (' ? A v *s 
i nst runted to ! promot e an uraer st a n n ; no of American n o u o v  and 
suupnr t u i cv-U . S  . government s inrf or ouref ; wh '* e rnnver fir* ! y , i f 
wao to undermine or destard lice prn-Snv i et or an t ; - Aner i car? 
regimes -tno social groups. The nr unar y evamn!e of i/.S.
coverr irtiyity in the region occurred m  Guatemala throughout 
hay >na Juno ui ! . Inc operation, design** fen oner-at; on
Auccess . Cv rn i na t eo »n t he over t hr ow ot Pr es $ den t lac non A *" ne c *?
who was nisi ikr»d ny t h e  U.G. .inti had "leftist t enoenr i e s . :
(Pos i t » 1 /5 anct 18^- i QO ) This second successf ij ) u.S* cover t 
action ana i r; r a i sed guest i nrr; of why Arne r h u  ■ n t e r veneny
f or mer t, I A off i r*; ■-* « , Da v i d Ph i I 1 ps , who n >r f i r* j r>a t ro i n : n *•*:
-rf .a. ....•,
’*Der i t ■ on . s t  a t e s  f •' a t f  r nrn t h e  e v i d e r ■jce he r e v i e w e d ,  , t warn' a
• n«Jt i t  • e d ! c o v e r  t o p e r  a t i nr. t  r, a t w a s c l e a r ■v d e s i a n e o  .j h a l t
Soviet Coin V u  e<r>ans ,np: o n . ” ( Ph i i i p*^. H.i)
The U.S. conducted some covert paramilitary operations i r> 
the Far E a s t  , spec i i i ca 1 ! y i n Ch i na < sma I * ^ rt r j  f a i l  e n  
insurgency). South Korea (minor naval and air operations), and 
Tibet (assisted an a t r a i n ert 71 be t: a ? * qu e r r i i a s ; . ( Fa ; n . 6^ ' m n
) However . this trend of infrequent and sma i } covert
Parami * it-my operations would change in the nevj oecaae. in 
tact, the U.S. government, encouraaeo by its successes in 
Uuat err»--» i a arid I r .1 n , and idv i s e r f  oy Inf- j uent i a \ cove?* t o p e ra  t n r~<:,
wr»u i r i rely more and more on CIA par ami i i t ar y operations to
f**erute policy. Fur t her more , U.S. successes encnur uoed the 
increased the use of covert operations In the Third World, ana
chanaed the focus of Amer ican »nte i » ,pence from ’ h a r d ” to ‘sq.ft 
t arget s , wh i ch are sor i a I . pn t 1 t 1 ca i and econom i c ict * v \ t i e s .
( Poo i t :* k e . 102)
l y m z i s m
The first half of the 1960s saw the growth in cost of all 
U.S. covert operations. Between 1 9 6 4 -1967, evpendstores for
covert operations composed fifty to sixty percent of the total 
CIA annual budget, with 1967 being the pinnacle year. Never 
again wouI a covert operations control such a commanding portion
■ ‘ - ‘I V' '
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i 9~B CS e e  A p p e r m i v 4 ? . c .Jo h n so n  , ) Os )
In the early and m i d - ’960s. there was an increase in 
number of p m  i t i c* -: . p q v n o i f i q i r ^  . counter- front 'md »*vrn 
ernnoni I c oper at i on«? t o comba t t he-export ed communist ' f.e'r'"' i ut ] on * 
 ^F a j n , ti i ^  and f%H7 ) Also, pa raff* if * t ary' opiera t'-i'bri% e *par oeo 
nr ast i c * 1 l y , not h In number and i n  i og i st I ca ! in f raaf rue* u*"e . 
wh i oh'' pr.ovj.ded.■■■x ra i ned personne I y m.i* or i e ], 'trasoo.', ot; a f f . S n o / 
money . ( Pos i t zw . ; RS >
dust j t I car j on tor t he covert oper * t I or?o of . -1 ne first naif
of r ho 3 c*fiOs was e s s e n t l a i ! v  oar r i eci over f r o m  the or ev i ous
decane * and cou I rt be found in t he ooa 1 s of cover t a*or ; v i r I os 
conduct on in Kcu-mor arm Chile, born of which cal led for the 
following: 1 ) to counter Increased Soviet advances arm 
an t i -Amer i can inf) uences ♦ 7 > t o break r e ; a t I oris w i f n Cuba arm
halt their exportation of revolution* and 3> to strengthen 
non - Common i st pari ies and or nan I 7, at 1 ons (and support f r 3 e n o « v 
regimes). (Positeke* 1^ 0 and 192?
pur i no the :9ftOs, the main regions In which a I ' tvprs of covert 
oner at inns were directed against wer^ Indochina and C u o a . In 
the case of the former, the CIA conducted operations in South
Vietnam, Laos* China, Cambodia, arm North Vietnam. In p-ach of
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a r - r i n n s  n e s i o n e n  t o  o v e r  r h t  nw C u t t e r - , .  • ; r e r  , n . h ; - , p  o f  t Qt;
s s f i o f  * o e  o w » i  i ;  i o n ' s  w e r e  a p p r  o v e i i  ; o e  o r v i o i . o r  e o  r.v . . ; s . 
t r a m e o  C u r . a n *  W i i i s i  t p r i u g t r  R .  a n n  t r a r . s n o r  t •, t j on r a r  a e  r •=•. 
T h e  e n t i r e  o p e r a t i o n  w a s  t o  " n o u t  I rrh ,  i r i t o f  r e ? : ' ? !  , n r e  
n i  s a t  t e r t i o n  w h i c h  c o u  i d  l e a d  t o  s i o n i  t i c a n t  h k i  o t h e r  n v  
p r  orluf't. ?  o f  u n r p s ?  . - < P n g i r ^ i < R ,  j ? q  j
sSSilBiiiiiKBiSiSsSsii
‘Other oypr Olivet s of unrest ' was a euphero i sm which neat. :y
ref erred . t o assassination. In 196fi, there were n i on ann ow
t;e ve i ■ a r scus 8 Ions of aosass 1na t ino Cast r <a , ■Accor di ng to 8ober?'
Mcfjv*, «r i, th en Secte to f V O f fie fe • ’ e „ thoijgh-ts-'-of ,such ycr. . or ''
we?e »ustjt i <eg :to *h e official oue r r> ?. ’mor»d nt h yster ia i ft
t r y ! ng to oe t rid of ■Castro. C Pibs,i i:W h - 199) M a n v ; j n : flue
=fna rtf?ver itdess w e n e suggested c i . e , , p !sc i no h ia den e x p ■1 os jt v m s
i n  a o u n c e *>he • j at C a s t r n  s f a v o r  i t e t i l  v i  no  c o v e  ) : n n v H v r r ,
m o s t  o f  t h#* s e  e x t  r  av a g s n t  1 t ie ,S| S* f| pi::e r an  t p a s  f t n e p ; *n n 1ng
r ane . f i t  *v e r  a 11 emn t s  r> r  o o r  e * ;• :ed f a r t her. ,  w i t h * : ' r mv -n t )  : e ,
<\ \ s s  i ne  rt t <p; a n d e v e r? t h e  M a f i a . in i t *“> *'»fhe o f  ! h e s c  p ; AT\e* 'VS' e
e ^ d c u t  e n , I f ’ F e b r u a r y  i . ;O p e r s t i on Monf ioo'- f*  w.i c* f f» r rn ; r, a f f
( R o s  i t 2 t e , 19? - - 9 8 ) D i s c u s s  I n n  o f s u e h a ct  s  n e v e r n 1 1 t r  * s a i i v
o c o u r r e a  ari.-, ] r - a f t e r 196 x  ann t h e  11 . F>. C o n g r e s s *  la t e r  f r- r n  i ? je
the U*S. to ever conduct or plan assays i n* t i oris .
The ni3 tor turning point In the history of U .S . r o v e d  
operations occurred in 196? when Ram p a r t g magazine printed 
articles, mentioned earlier in this paper, starino that the CIA 
was “ infiltrating1 American organizations and using ‘agents1* to 
dupe volunteers into carrying out secret programs in the 
domestic arena- a violation of the CIA s charter . The article 
also exposed the financial and influential relatinnships between 
the CIA ana the National Student Association, This expose
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r e v o s u f  i or>, 2 > s u p p o r t  pr o - A m e r  1 can a! ! I e s , a n a  3) s u p p e r  t 
ant i - tjjmmun i at a n d  pro*-Amer i c a n  n r g a n  j rut i n r m  t h r o u o h o w t  t ho
world,, .ihese g o a l s  are, e x e m p  1 if | e d  o y  t he o p e r  at i o n s  t p a r  w o r e
f *nduc tea. H n n e r  Mix on , t w o  , op e r  a t 5 on s an e o f
f» f f i  f ' f * '~ < r . T h e f : f* «5 t nr r*1<r r e d  * n Ch i i e ana i nsr
i ; er r>:-r t i es f f'*0 ; e a r o r he o e m r - d  -v: tea :
r .1 a . ( Po o i t ~ e , ‘ '■* 2 a r» d Pr a d n s  , 3] 3 i




c a m p  a i ap a n a  t r y i n g  to nr e von t h i s  ion tv p n - ^ r  s.« i "Armr
n 1 ' v-',c> *'5 f'Je i 1 pr ac I a .men Mai v i st wrw: w.,r.t en tn n o w -  't h
a nn v’oc i a i ,i ?e the Chi ! e =i r» econniTiy . Fur t her ru »r e
? hr* no* i:i r e t f) f O 1 •;*•; d »t Jf ; r:'U ! 5 K r f i r ,n str engthen
* he S:;V ,e t Lin 3 cjn inu fan * . T, ,i * * ro» ^ -it er * i rafiiD
P : U t ] {J f I S w  j T n
................... - ... * an , th e  L I. S .
nr>';er r : s w p i o r u a  O i - e - . r  :>v ; t • «: j . p u * , „ c  r h-. r  w e r e
m o n e r  a t e i y nr> t he he f t arid snrr.e r  ^t w e r e  nn t he Pi nh t  . 1 r,
rne U.H. su n p o r  t e d  r a n m  da i e , r d u o r d n  F r o  , wo n :  vet, : m  
-oS. ran? i nuer? to auoport, m o d e r a t e  M o n o r  e e s  : on a ; r a r n : n a f  e», 
t r a i ri ar-d -issie.r ,in ? i * C o m m o n  i at oe-rn.-.n : u -o m j  ' -,r*nr u m i i .p o  lir.r: 
st^on ear a n t. i - A I ) en ae < S o  v l e t )  m e d  i a an a p r nn<* qa r a a . : P o a  i r z  *  e ,
in l Q '■ v , the i.J. S . a i a  not s u p p n r  t a n y Mh i « e i n r no j oo r e rr, j r
at t e m p t e d  to - h a r a s s  a n o  pr e v e n  t All end**' s  e j ect > or.. r or f m on
* - X e
k, ^ £r' *■ ' •- f' *,
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'^aaiifiaigtn and even direct contact with congressmen% however.
AI lends w*s elected, (Rositzke. i^3>
The U.S. government did everyth i no over i i y ana cover t ! v 
within i *s p o w e r . snort of war. to hinder and destroy h ; *> 
reni me. This barr aue of financial , politic**, arid military trhe 
training of Ch i1ean officers) e ff or ts w*s c o m p 1ement ed oy the 
Septemner ii, jwvs roup of Alienne by Uener*i Augusto p ,n o c n e r . 
There is no evidence that the CIA, tne American Emoassv in 
Chile, or the U,S, military attache direct iy Diaven vc* role in- 
the coup or even ynew ot Pinochet s plan. N e v e r \n e ■e r ^ . the 
U.S, destroyed a communist rename and contained the m v ^ \ f;r. n * 
Soviet influence. However. U.S, efforts led to a r e p r ^ s i v e  
gcft ct at Of 1 a ! regime inste id, and damaged U.S. cr eti i via
ntegr ity throughout the world. (Positzu?. ar>g f-i|n,
?6J )
■ The other operation was that of the U.S. secretly funding 
the Kurds in Iraq from 1 9 7 2  until 1975. In i°?0, the Kurds and 
; the Iraqi government had established a tentative p e a c e . which 
worried the Shah of Iran, wno was a major U.S. ally in rhe
M
region. Upon the Shah's urging, the U . S . . along with Iran ana
‘A-'VrU^4 Uv;i. Mil HlXw -u7*44o4;Vy ^ ->
- *’** -* * '
" Y .v, ’ rr  ^■ K “ C
^4- * -‘"44ft
- . Af onica 11y Israel. h*cwn to support the Kurds, who were not
«pnk#* I'wf;stinAtt»ti|. th:«h'‘^ rr«rt#gi W.,
-ftl-:._\ :
Presioent Nixon and Secretary of State--* National Security
'\l' '
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Adviser -Kissinger both approved the operation and instructed - 
: A Vfrect L . Atherton* J r . to breate the fundi no network, '’ Over; the' 
years* the CIA provided the Kurds with several P i n i o n  dollars 
in arms and money, aiorm with Iran and Israel, to tunn over 
1 0 0 ,0 0 0  we I i~equi pped K u r d lsh t r o o p s . <Pr a n o s . 3 1 3 -314)
However, jusi as the Kurns prepared to U u n m  an aft at:*, 
the U .S . . now ju<?aiinri the October War between the Arabs and 
Israel , ordered the DC? to instruct the Korns riot to. Hr? Marc*
9, I9?S„ the Sh ~ h . who had recently smoothed his relations with 
Iran, halted fundi no and demanded the U.S, an so as we I , . The 
Iraqis attacked the Kurds on March torn. The loral CIA 
officials uroed the U.S. not to abandon the Kurds; however . tne 
government aecided to do ust that. (Prados, 314-315) Born C h i 'e * 
,and the above operation, again raise moral and ethicti nu?sr ; nr?s 
34hich will oe addressed later in the paper.
The ma i n covet t oper a 1 * on dur i n g the For n Ar jrn > n i st r at ? can 
as conducted in Angola (Operation Feature) to counter the MPLA 
K?>rde facto government, which the Soviets and Cubans heavjiy 
supported. In January 19?5, President Ford had the CIA send 
twenty-five million dollars worth of equipment to two *nti-MPLA
Wdr^fcffc'd fcoojMu m a t e r l e r ’ana money to tee cause
:!!&!
Furthermore, the CIA recruited mercenaries (some American) to
-fight for the anti-MPLA m  oups. However, a year I * t er , Onnoresg 
prohibited and ended * M  such supnort via the Clar* Amendment.
£ Prados 341-345) This marked the first time that Conor ess enrjecs 
a covert opera t ion- it would not ne the last time. <Pos i t zkf*,
264)
The year 1 Q?r> is deemed by some evpert.s as the ’Year of 
Intelligence.1 In that year, the president, via the Por^tpi ((?r 
Commission, and the Congress, via the Church and Pi*^
Comm \ 1 1 ees, launched investigations into the activities nt 
CiA and other intelligence agencies. (PositEhe, 238) The 
American peop I e , Congress inn r he meni ■*• began. to. guest ion t pf* 
actions, means, and motives of the government and the t: ] j r. ^ ; 
types of intelligence. Covert operations note the nrunt of 
these investigations, as congressionai committees severely 
scrutinized the CIA's activities in this area.
The reaction of the public and the media f w - , to say the 
i east. extremely negative to the alleged and or confirmed r> i m  g 
and plans of assassi nat ion (Operation Mongoose), arun-testing
w-' .JV” - r' > ‘ ' ) x ’
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" • ' • ; • . ■ ■ ■  , , ............ ,
fWflWRpfth ctomest ic mail open lng& ana jtt&vnr' &cX iyit.iWs;:
■?©ft.'Ch*«P•, ftncTpovert operations <Operations fortune.
ti m  e h U s U  T*W O A  was portras'ea ds, .C
r<‘f' •mm
lllil:#lte':iasg
*wttrid 'of, 9 rote$que shapes and s h a d o w s ” w i t h ’, 
agents ana officers who were ’'killer*? and fanatics* (Positive. 
234 > During this time, mat or American periodicals, in exposing
these wiln pints, always e i f ed "r e !i ^nip s o u r c e s  nr sources 
c i ose to tne a am t n i s t r a t \ on ; h owe ver , n n t h S n o va s e v e r 
ot f l c i a i l y pr oven or ver i t l e a . a»-d t he on j v r 1 ear ; t w-*s
that such stories drummed up a n f i - C ; 4 senr j rr<e,d *; jn the 
government and genera I public. (Pnr?{ r a* e , r.ou -kkn) The nyne .»??d 
conjecture treat the i n vest ': i =* t ; on° ;■ iii^ eri wa-. v«;f *-m rh
t h e  a c t u a l  r o m r > i r r ee  f u i d  1 ;1 a o .
The cor? or ess i ona i i nvest » oar i cns e *posea noth , r t er n -* t 1 r,o 1 
ana domest i c operations conducted ny the c j a . some rtf t ne 
Operations revealed were i ': i : , -..rxt.e we: M -ibsu: d, ihd St 
others were ?ust itiatde within the reset t*vr nf rne:r t irr»e 4r *n*e. 
However, the American puhiic ana for that matter, tne V-X- 
Cor? or ess were shocked to discover that the CIA was so motive in 
areas where it was forbidden, and areas which were q u e s t i o n a o Ie . 
(Posi 1 7 * e . 23?>
One of these questlonanie areas (for it was not foro;nden 
yet) was assassination. The Senate Select Cc.mnwrfee n?
nf t e t f - v i t - c h a i r e d -  by Senator frank Church*-' - , v , 
a ^ c h n d - a  part leu 1 a.r !y vigorous investigation into CIA 
• assassination operat ions, which uncovered the toil owi no p 1 ots . 
etr^luili Cure *s Castro*- Vietnam's Oiem. Congo s Lum u m b a , and the 
' p m i h i c m  Trujillo* <Srados, 233 and $ 3 3  > A H  of these
a^sassi na t } on Diets were nevi sen ana a t r empt ed d m t weer ? 060 *no
The various plots tailed against (.‘astro, as discusser* 
i^ ar ! * er i n the paper; however* I) i em was * i ; led nv uene»- a I s
r h( ow \ ng a i.KS, supported c o u p , vn i ’e Lomutnoa r^id Tru i 1 In were
m u r d e r e d  fsy r e t i e  i s *  w h i c h  ! n o n t h  : n s* a n o e s  w e re  r e r - p i v i n o  onrra* 
s o r r  o f  U ’ S • c ° v e r  t  a s s  ; a t a n n e  . <..Fa 1 n , :;2 8 4 - ? S 6  > -  The: Crv-.o-h T-i i
C n m m  i r  t e e t  e f e a s e a  t h r e e " o r  i t. ! c  i ‘ m o ­: '  o f t h e  a s s i s s i n a r i t O  P l O t t :
w h i m  c r * ! ’ e n , i > t h a t  a l  l o t  t h e  p  ; o r  -  * S a v e  t h e  a t t e i a p t  s  o n
C a s t  r o  s  i , f e *  w e r e  .■"■not r e p r e s e n ? a t : v e o f  a n  ■ i m m i  p e n t d a n a e r  t o
t n e  1 . S . . ■I > t h a t  t h e  c o m m  i t  f  e e  d o e *:' r- n t a c c e p t  t h e
: t > •'; r * < j c a  r • o n  f o r  t r ^ o e  o p e r  a t i o ? i s  !w a s t h a t  t h e s e  j  f a r e /  »■; w e r * *
a '■ f u  f a . i t a r  i a r . a  , a n d  T > ■. ■that  w h e n t h e S e  p  | o f  s  i m r  e  1 r ? v  e  ,* t it ~ 1 y
e a p o s e n .  t h e y  a i d  i r  ? e p a r •n: ;  e  d a r M O t a t o A s * o  h e  a s  f  o p  u  , Cl" d o ; f ‘
t o  m e  “ g o o n  n a m e  a n d  r e p u t a t i o n  o f t h e I f n i  t e d  S t a t e s - a b r o a d " .  * .-.
ar?n t o  m e  s u p p o r t . ,  n nd f i i t h  o f  ? he. .  Apner •>-<?*& puo.l 1c  t h .  t h e  
a o v e r n m e n t . ( F a i n .  7 8 2 )
The committee heard testimony from Dei Richard Helms who 
st a ten he condemned assassination plots her-,use :> serrerv was
twossio.i# and 2 ) 'his w o t t i m  that any assassination' w o u l d  s^ay* 
.-’'teshinci; a. n#w person worse than the one just tcl-l i*a; • V  ’ ' 
vfurtbsrifjar^, Hetms testified- that M t  wasn't because I -have i o s ’fe 
% y  cool, dr because I ha^e lost my cwatg fthat.l d I o a p p r o v e . A t '- 
;ass e s s ioat ions! * it simply is because I d o n 't think if is a  " \
-v 1 ab 10  Cot mar a I 1 opt ion,*' The cnrnmi tree's cone I us ion st a t erf 
that it '‘condemns assassination anc thoroughly re»ects It as an 
instrument of American policy1', a no it further ca! ten for 
i egi o f a t i ve or execut i ve act i on t o proh * n I t theoe opera t t ons . 
(rain 8-J / - 8UR ) I he comr ? t t ee r ere t veo prompt m:t ,• nr when
P* evident Furo i soueri evecu t \ vp or ner 1 f *^ DF> nr nh i n rf i no-
s pr ‘tty ?s , ' W ;
i n e  r e v e l a t i o n s  o f  * h e s e  r  
to :at>e! the d o  ■ -j ■rooue elenhanf out of f 
2d?) Contrary to Senator Chur 
House Select Comm • t r ee on Intel
o I'! u t e r ■ 1 -r n h'3-c  *Uf .'U • O f*
o» H' ( -vtry e f~*C i t T V *■* or S'-* r c*: •
\ a b u s e c  C a i i s e ri s e n a t o r  r;h';;rfth
it ■■<:n.i t ■ of o or t ! I l l  . { Pr !• ' ! '->■
' ** ,
e g s  o n c e r v at i o n  . n owe v'e*' »
he
oer ! c e n o n e t u n e o :
3 t: h a t t he r r A. d i r  f r o m  ne i
no
r er5ptv o i v e t o S h e i n s t r u c t  »r% ? v . t ■» ,
i  n
if>
w . , *:r*r * sr ant t o the rr^sidtnn ryi **'
Sec ur 1 1 V of fairs. < Pas i t z to e • I'Sfi)
n]A o t t i c U l s .  pas? ana present , uei>* q-.n .-k tn aet**?'0 ' th"
company" saying. • the CIA Phou ! d t* t, I r»r. i v for M "  :
ton. 'not f o r  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  c a r r y i n g  out  of  oad pol i c i es - :  
The^e, -.-of f  J d i a 1 b  accused th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  f o r  choos* I no the  
I'lMppmiptt of- ttte ClA/s c o v e rt o p e ra tio n s ., for example, '-they
,;5-^aid" f.het •-!/f forest den t ‘Johnson had l jstoned to the' Cl A on 
t|. ,of • Koc th Vietnamese mi li t  ary strength, then the Oa-r.-'---
}.!•;‘may have ended sooner . < Posi tzfc e , 333 and 343)
At the-end Ot a n  rhe investigations, the overall conclusion ov 
each of the committees was tru-it « ?he ij.S. s*r>u { o n- t i r,; >; n m e  
option of reacting in the future to , q r.v>, unto: se*n r nr ear ro 
11. S . nat i nna i secur ; t y through onVPrt measure*'. c F 1 ; n . >‘,w o  : ne 
conclusions ’were summar i zed, m  Dart, ov m e  report of m e  House 
Se 1 ect. Cornm i r. t ee on Intel 1 iuenre:-
1) Cover t ^rr ion must be se*r. ^  iHn ^vcept m r u !  ^ct . -o r,e
undertaker only m e n  rnr i o n r  see,,, jtv r Pati ( t n ^hei;
over- means w, 1 1 not ,=;uf f -ce. r Fur ? hermore .■ , the pnl icy inn
ut f'cecjtifu-i J rrnw iers -re present : v ; r( ,dea , , m  t ; . nou -e t nat ,rtV
covert operat ion 1 s absolutely r r; rhe nat Iona
security. These barr n*rs must ne tianter.en ,rU i raised.
2 ) Covert action must in no case he  ^ vehicle for
c i a ridest i ne i y under t ak i nor ac t i on h j ncomp a t i m p  j t r Amer ■ r -, j. 
principles. The Committee has already moved to Connr?n 
assassinations and ro recon-meno 1 sr - m r o  to f o r m a  s.urh 
arr 1 vjry. . . the standards to accept e r!-Verf k ”t i v u v  shr>;<,n
v in a t . r in a f huma n r  1 ah t 3 .
i t  I f :r- o ' l ; *1 n 1 1 t er. • n  t hr } r  jre. er ’
P t o v i < le s u  n n o r t f  o r fi t 31 i r e  n r  o t h e r
v h  i c h er «« t  t i t  • ; r t hr* r ‘V ' ’ t r,f, ; j T , r-i
* *
t mu *4 f b e b a s e d n r 1 r a r e ■ fiu , 1  ?•rt
g  i v e u s  I t’ u a t : 0  n » p O S S i r.) I e * ; t e r r, a r - ■,
e r  i r  ar i I i 11 e r  e « - 1 o f 1 r * f * e p o o s  j n , 0
outcomes, and above all, the l*eiy oonseauenre** nt an atrempt 
ro intervene... Br inning the i n c y,,rci di rert y tfiro tfu, ,f)rrr;^ 
decision process would be a partial remedy... More important
ypU]<* ^  the insistence'of -the director of Central Intelligence, 
that the political premises of any proposed'covert operat ions fee
rigorously analysed, fFa 1 n 6*3 and 694) ■, .
The committee also  released findings sp e cifica lly  on i
paramilitary operations which concluded that such activities in 
/Laos, Anaola and elsewhere were "an anomaly, if not an 
latest ration'of covert action,H These operat ions are the "most v : 
costly and controversial forms of covert, action" and they are 
"difficult, if not impossible, to c o n c e a I .“ Furthermore, the 
committee expressed its concerns on the chance that conducting 
such opera t 1 on? in other n a M o n s  oouId p o s s :b i y eocalate into 
ma tor military commitments. (Fain, 688>
These c o n e )us Ions ano t ind i nos by t he congressi n n a ! 
comm i t tees, for the f jrst fime, r e <efted American 'notifications 
for covert oner^t » o n s . They e 1 1 ieo c.n the agency and no » icy 
makers to weigh additional si gn if j cant factor s. frota i s , and y 
ethics, and nor iust ni indi y base operatIons on the conta inment 
ot Commun ’ s m . e 1 • m l n 5r l ng u.nf r tend! y gover nment s , and 
buttressing Amer » can ai 1 les. The demand for " e *'r>f»r t s" , who 
would analyze both long and short term effects nt ouch 
oper it i on o i n i t i at j on , conduct , and resu i t s . 1 o be 1 nr; i uded i r 
the dec i si on ma* i ng process is somewhat unprecedented. It is 
unprecedented in the fact that U.S. operations in Iran,
Guatemala, Chile, and other nations were incessantly concerned
with and -focused on s h o r t  term objectives only. F i r m l y ,  the 
condemnation of paramilitary activities radically altered the 
CIA's focus of-operations* and once again . c h a l l e n g e  the 
iradi t Iona! just i f icat ions for all covert activlties over the 
’ |:ast' thirty- years. 7
Op unt-ii ■ iP80, the Carter Administration's attitude towards 
i)]; tfcfrwri operations ref 1 ected that of the American Public. Toe 
President and most of his advisors had "considerable 
r esc r vat ions about the mor. .»» i t v n t cover t *ct i nr»s . ’ The ma *or
exception was the nat 1 nn 3 i seour ; t y .idvisnr , ;’ot on I **w
Bc?e? i ns* . . who advocated the cover t option. yr r . e .*ee i n this
period of reluctance and doubt on covert activities, tee li.S,
conducted cover r operar inns, The dt f f erencc r w i  tne
tusr i f I 'car j nr?s tor ouch riper '1 * I ons w e r e not *v ^  enpr a i ried ones
from pre', 1 ous decades. In f net , { jf: : rti. rier f+% r r p d  the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d i d  n o t  s e f  t o r e s p o r . o  c o v e r  * v p o t h e r
intfnp.u mn-ii events, ouch as the iril,.' M o s q u e  Cr i ‘5'0 ’,r!U r *’*'
Sonnet invasion of A f on an i st an . diet t ^  a no recess : it ed sru-’h
r pi-t -vicec. (Turner . BT >
Aci tie f rnrn the \ Ofr; a r r err.pt ed r ec?rri.^ nf ?r .^n . -.n n e : d 
Ajr«er ; cap hoot- ^ oes t )per 1 r ; on K 10 . e c; j ; . r, ? nc T ; A f} - ?
a iimi ten covert role ana some minima; covert politic** suoon? t 
to U i r.iraouan dissidents <Woodward, n ^ ) # Afah-mior-n was
■c?mf*nti*Uy .the only ether major. c o v* r * „ . .
■f ‘ oper.5. t i on initiated
under i he Car ter A am i ni st r a t i on . After r*
H e r  rhe invasion , the f;f a
t mined i at e fy ‘set about* p f ann ! no and or pan „. r • 1 * n i nq cover r responses*
Bv .farm arv l^HO the IKS. was covert fy qnr,r,.■ *' ♦ supply m o  weapons ro the
/ imij.stedean,: e t . d ! ., resistann<- group* Egypt *„«* China"as*isr.*q
the .U.S.* in a joint supply phase at the operation hy pmvirtlro 
, an training, Russ i an w e a p o n s . -and Oh i ne$* equ i'ptssent, and'. -
weapons. The-goal was. as Bczez I ns* I stated, “ to ma*e sure toa -0
the- 5c vlets paid some price for their invasion. (Prados,
353 *ihO )
On another facet of eovei ? noer -tt ions, Car ie« cor t i nue<- t re
Pr  V :  ? ; or* of F r f c i  a-'n K i  i-s| , fjy  ! ! - n  hr *u ■ a n * r
Pr es s den rial f i no j nos ( vequ = r*vj oy f h* Huuhes - P i. v. Arr-endmeu t )
w n  : :*!*h U’ r n J O ’ i ; s  ? > * .‘ v  e ;, S? ■* f r  t *: i V e  T t r .' f , f ■ - , • _ m . •-; • n i •; n r
t h r u ' ■ i t s  s u c h  * s .  *■♦-? r o * i u rn  n a  r •: -'"< * e s ,  f t * .  n i O S .
W T S t h e  * i r s t  t  ; rne t  r - a t ■ ! S - . w P O  1 ■ *' f  - ; e  *. ' e  • * ’ ’ ; { ;t>e,;..
■’dot ^ssea w?rh rrovert -.act ions.
the r e , i,c t unr-e to nt | i , ye "overt or.-:. c-o the
quest ion inn of their moral iry a a e*n .car usaue ;j.t > ro t ne 
Carter er wou > a a I i de n : scon n t, *»n unner e s . \ie», t H** ci c ; .
Det ini t p i y oy i 9R0 anrj ever: rrot eso t»y 1 v ri , * h e  nor on : nr r* ac
swuno from rest r a * r: i no the r none e i eph at: ? 1u ».•.. e-isn . c« j t he
C* A . <Prados. 351) A new era. reminiscent df the lQ5(Pr, vrn» { tl
occur, andcover t operation®? would no longer ne * rogue “ . out
* vogue “ .
m u z i s m
The Reag&r. Administration entered office with the 
philosophy that America had grown weak under Carter * that the 
country's military might was stripped, and that the Soviet Union 
i and other Communists) were once again threatening the nation s 
existence, Reagan and his advisors, specifically DC! Casey, 
explicitly beIieved in the beneficial and lust!tied use of 
covert operations, In fact, by IR84 the IKS, was conducting
-S’ -1t ; W I S  • liT - i ; •  ^ :■ - 'll' ■ ' ■ I " '■ ' ■:! ■ l.v;t ';v& ■ ^  =r.M-
approximately fifty covert operations, with more than'Hull 
tfttse occurring in Central and South America, This represents"'a 
SOC percent increase ®? i nee Carter s last year In off Ice.
< Prados, ^?o)
The administration s overall goal of utilizing such 
operations was expressed in NSDD-T5 (national security decision 
directive) as to 'prevent nations from turnj ra toward the Cuban 
(Soviet! model.’1 This directive specifically justified covert 
activities in Afghanistan. Nicaragua, and Angola. A further 
directive, NSDD-138, gave the CIA the additional role of 
“executing preemptive and retaliatory strikes against 
-terrorists.M The obvious target from this direct 1ve was Libya, 
and its leader Huammar Quaddaf i. (Prados, 37 1> The Utter
directive was a definite move by the administr*tion and the 
agency to address current problems outside of the traditional 
CIA realm.
"There has rarely been a closer team of President and DC1 
than Ronald Reagan and William U. C a s e y ,1 (Prados, 367 > They 
had the same ideas on where covert operations would go and what
ooals they would achieve. Casey s philosophy was to focus 
primarily on paramilitary and political action operations, and 
with Reagan s approval, that is precisely what he did, (Prados, 
360> In Afghan 1 stari, the CIA continued the previous 
acfcrdnistration s weapons supply operations, under the
®r j J;:; S: 1;: ■% p. ']$:.■ : -'j : ;•: ■ ■  W §f| - K f
ic-stion of a "cold war sspoillng operation-,
v ;• * r - s - ■" ’ ; - : - • ,r « yj|k:
iitS. upgraded the program with modern u^aponcy and increased 
financial support. For example, the U.S. between 1^80 and 1904. 
gave approv imate1y S625 mill ion m  aid to the Afghan resistance. 
(Prados, 360*361)
In Nicaragua, the U.S. pursu'd its covert activities with 
an even greater fervor than any other operation, U . S . 
just i f i cat i on was expressed In the March 1981 Presidential 
Finding which stated that a covert response was "desirable to 
halt the flow of arms to guerrillas in the neighboring nation of 
E i Salvador." Further justificat ion was delineated in NSDD-1 7,
which outlined the actual operation and state as its additional
goa| as * to eliminate an alleged Cuban presence and 
Cuban-NIcaraguan support structure in Nicaragua.” The actual 
operation began small with an allocation of nineteen million 
dollars which, along with Argentinian training assistance, would 
sustain a force of 1500 contras. This force and the CIA itself, 
amongst other activities, would primarily conduct various covert 
paramilitary ana political act Ion operations. Over the next 
four years, the Peagan Acfrninistration would spend over 100 
million dollars in support of tne Contras, (Prados, 378-3?9 a no 
401 )
From !980 through 1984, the operation had little success,
and was plagued with several scandals, including the following*
;>V;' r ' v
m e m b e r s h l p of i i ! ^reputed Somozan national guardsmen; I n  the .• 
red!stancel the agency's distribution of a guerrilla warfare 
manual to the Contras which mentioned the use of terrorist 
tactics and assassination; and the CIA mining of Nicaraguan 
ports. These scandals culminated in Congressional backlash. In 
1985, all U.S. funding for the overthrow of the Sandinist* 
regime by the Contras was halted by Congress under the Boland 
Amenrsnent. (Prados, 386-395) Furthermore, the resulting 
negation of funds caused Reagan to derive alternative means for 
funding the contras. One way was appealina tn the American
§§
t i ;
public, the other was to set up a rtback-door“ program via the 
NSC, cPrados, 3^5>
The last statement raises two issues that pertain to covert 
operations which merit d iscussI o n . The latter issue again 
points to the excesses that have plagued the CIA and its covert 
operators for the last forty years. The faux p.aus under Reagan 
was the now infamous Iran-Contra Affair. The plan behind this 
affair was very elaborate, and somewhat ingenious; however, it 
clearly violated every letter of the law. In short, the NSC 
staff* specifically Admiral John Poindexter < NSA > and Coionei 
Oliver North, proceeded to divert funds from a secret arms sale 
to Iran (or Iranian moderates as some contend) (Woodward,
432-435>, to the Nicaraguan contras. (Johnson, 18) Aside from 
the legal ramifications, the American government's credibility 
once again suffered both internationally and domestically. 
Although Reagan's stance on covert operations came in iike the 
19 6 0 s . it proceeded to leave like a somewhat watered down 
version of the 19 ? 0 s . Once again, the morals, ethics, »nn 
continued use of cover t operations were in the spot light and 
became a source of much heated public debate.
The other way of funding the contras, by appealing to the 
American public, distorts the definition of $ covert operation,
To undertake a covert operation entails that tne evidence
4 °
of the
operation is untraceable to the sponsoring entity. Can an 
operation really oe deemed covert when the country admits to 
conduct i nu it? Is an operation covert when the President of the 
United States, in a televised speech, appeals to the ration and 
to the Congress to support and sponsor such covert activities? 
According to the definitions furthered in this paper, the term 
covert operation floes not app i y . At inast it fines not aonly in 
the sense of being "plausibly deniable. John Prados concurs in 
stating that "the Peagan years have left plausible den lability 
in tatters," (Prados. 3B5)
By 1^89, the winds of change were blowing throughout the 
world. The curtains of Communism were lifted in Eastern Europe, 
in Central America, and partially in the Far East, The 
Communists lost control of or influence in most of Eastern 
Europe, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Laos. The nations of 
the world were rejecting the East and communism, although some 
like Cuba or Vietnam ciung to it only because their dictators 
din not want to lose power. Remark 3b;e social, political, and 
economic changes occurred that no one, not even the intelligence 
experts, expected or predicted. Yet. such changes were not 
limited to the Communist periphery or outer orbit; no, these 
revolutionary changes struck 3t the very cote of cornmun i srn - 
within the Soviet Union and China, The end of the i?80s found
these two count rJes faced with severe internal disorder* 
frustration* ana upheaves. These radical events altered the 
nature of the intelligence “n a m e s " . including covert action* 
that the U.3. had been play inn for the last forty y e a r s . The 
joooo require the U.S. to scrutinize It.s unuis. motives and 
lustifications for its operations, and to raise serious 
questions -mout the future of covert operjtiur.n.
Part III
The. J  Q^.Qs.T„ new f o cu.s. f o r  a new war j d .
The radical chances from the late idHOs c-<rr;en over into 
the new ner:=tde, Pefor ms and new events continued throughout the 
world. Germany was united, Ntear aqua held free elections* the 
Sov let Ba 11 i c PepubI i 0 5 * e t . a 1 « , moved to secede trom the 
union* and a cease-fire was drawn up for Angola* Such triumphs 
caused the intelligence community to wonder admit its future.
With communist expansionism in decline and the communist 
states in chaos, tne U.S. intelligence community has henun to 
analyze "new" threats to our national security. Examples which 
w i n  be discussed in this p a p e r  are economic and scientific 
threats, terrorism, and drug trafficking. These problems are 
not "new" n the sense that they lust begun to occur; on the 
contrary, these proolems have existed for many years. However.
the 0.S . has not focused on them ben*use nf the communist threat 
and the policy decisions to concentrate on that first, and then 
everyth inn else second.
The sweepi no changes and the focus realignment have covert 
operators raising questions aonut their fixture rn-'e. 'With rnesr* 
new perspectives, what operations, it any, will thev conduct? 
W i n  the onerations he similar to those presently con due: t eg or 
will they differ? Who, what or where will he the new targets of 
such operations? T h e s e  are the questions wnioh this uart h o p e s  
to answer.
fcan dm jjx jj] t £j ..Licence
The most basic definition of economic intelligence is 
simply what - economists do in and for intelligence agencies.'1 
The difference between such private collection and analysis is 
that the task for economic intelligence is "to support the 
nation s strategy and tactics by means of economic data 
col lent ion and analysis" of bn t h c I a «$«.-* • f i e g a n ci unc i ass I f leg 
materials. Acquiring the information is usually the result of 
f‘ t ime-honored. as well as new fangien methods of spvino, 
yielding the intelligence collectors" the necessary data 
< L a q u e u r  , 40-41 )
Economic intelligence took on a orowing role during World 
War II. The OSS analysts were concerned not only v/lth Nazi 
military target*? nut also about the enemy's " tungsten and 
aiamend sunpI y , ft he ir ) product i on of ha I i hear i n g s , •and 1 the
Swedish iron ore supplies**1 < Laqueur , i9) The U ♦ S . quickly
recoon i zed the importance of the economic factors for the 
conduct o f  war. Ever since then, economics has been a part of 
American i r t e 1 i i gence : in f .u;t , there is ,in Office of Economic 
Research (OEP) within the CIA s Directorate of intelligence 
(HI). ( P i che l son . 28) Ini t i a \ } y , t; he CIA was r espons i hie f or 
gathering national economic intelligence on communist nations, 
wh i i e t hf* Ilep i r  t men ♦ o f  st at e w a s  respons 1 h i e f  nr r ne t o h e r  
worsd areas. H^wev^r. over the years, the latter s cole
her; 1 i ned wh i e the CIA over 1 or* m o r e respond i ni ! i t v , (Fain. <*n )
Over the years, the CIA, via the GEP, has eat atollshed 
teiatlonships with various committees or hoards which concern 
themselves with economic problems facing the U.S. (i.e., 
Committee on Internet i nnaI Economic Policy nr the U.S. 
Intelligence Board), The CIA has responded to such entity s 
econom i c i n t e . j : gen c m npp;.is, by spec ] f i o j j v pr ov i o i rg 
information to answer their KIQs t^ey i n t e M i g e n c e  questions) 
f present ] y called National Intelligence ^opics, through w e e k l y  
summaries, (Fain, 204 and Johnson, 8 l ) Furthermore, OFP has
produced several papers on many econntni r* coff-prn^ ihelurhmi; 
’*The World Oil Market in the Years Ahead" , ’Korea: The Economic 
Pace between the North and South" . and "China: In Pursuit of 
Economic Modern ; cat ; on ■' . (Riche Ison . 28)
Over the year?*, the CIA ha*? conducted numerous covert 
economic operations in various nations. One such nat ion that 
t o  r t he wr .itn o f  l ! . S  . Mm >noin I e oner a t > n n s  w a s  ( o b - i . pu r  \ n u  
iper at ion Mongoose , sc'a»r \ 3 ; jrn, ar t i v i t [ es n c 1 u d e o : ! ac j no 
t4,i2:S nans of Cuban sugar hound for' the Soviet n n \ nn wire *1 
harm I e s s . unpalat ahle chemical (however, president Kennenv 
dUiCKly ordered their c o n f :sc t t »on before o e ?;v e - v >. at tempt ino 
to demolish an economically vital rail y^rd, pressurino European 
shippers fn reticle Cuban cans i onment s , he-' *;u *d \ nn > Gerrn,^ 
ba I t-hear i no con.-nary to s**nd Cuba of f -certer bear: nos. and
attacking an 8,000 gal Ion o i ! tan* at the Cuban nnrt of Oasi Ida.
cpichelson, 230)
Furthermore, during 1969 and 1970. the CIA, with the aid of 
rapidly improving technology, conducted a series of operat i on*$ 
which again raised serious questions as to the morality and 
ethics of the institution s affairs. One included the 
successful "seeding" of rain clouds causing torrential rains to 
fall in nonagri c u )t u r a ) areas while ie*vino the famous sunar 
cane fields arid. The other involved the smugglino and
0 v
i n t r nil wo r ± or.- {if a v i. * j nf African svdne fever < *: r u s *, r« Cut),* 
wh i ah ser i ousi y dec ? rna f ed p ! g herd??, The sunsequenr ef tec t was ’ 
a shortage of pork, the nation's dietary staple, Other t ypes nf 
CIA sponsored covert economic operations include: c o u n t e r f e i t e d  
foreign cur r enc i es , '* depress i no the woe. if nr ice of aor \ cn i r ura i 
product s vital to adversaries in the developing woria' , 
con r am i n a t inn os | r esef ve*> nr unpp i ico, »o i p v i 1* t n ar> :
I o An «;, a n d the m I n i n o of h a r oar s . as in N i r a r •, qi t * ; p t he ! g«u s .
fJ o h n s o n . 26 and Piehelsnn, 2:"d ) ,
dr; e r a r: s a f e I y a ssume that su c h U . 3 . c n v e r t economic 
oner at i onr w i i i si i i ■ ne uf > ) . red, j f nenessar v * aoa t not 
nation s i n the 1‘^ O s .  As for M r g d i n u ,  no eypH r t has stated 
evpticit predict: (ins for u e is tna? the Si.:;, rr( i oh r concentrate 
on. The Soviet Union -inn of ner cnrnmun i «n nat ; or.s # even wit* 
their failing economies* v| i • p n w ; t v y  r>e -rviiyreo fur i her' ♦
verify actual domestic conditions. Another possible orordem 
reo; on will he Eastern Europe in that the li.S. may want to 
covertly supplement the fledgling capitalist economies.
Protecting the national economy from America s own allies* ♦ j w f» 
U a p a n . fiermanv , South Korea, and the European community* cou i n 
very we I ) lie at the epicenter of fut.ee t : r.
o p e r  a t i o n s .
S.s?J k o .c £. a o & . X e c M o L Q a v
During World War II. within the OSS. science and 
technologic*: intelligence was located in a special section
devoted to supporting covert operations by Duildina small 
weapons, miniature radio tr ansmi t ters and receivers, -urnery of 
t passports and other official documents and so forth. The CIA
oealt with scientific *nd technologic*} i r ► e 1 } ] cienre as early on
as 1^48 with the Office of Scientific and Photo Intel 1ipence.
In 19^3. the aaency established the Nat ional Photooraphic 
Interception Center ( N P T O .  Later in 1962. the CIA Incorporated 
this branch of i n t e 1 ! i in the Directorate of Science ana
Techno 1 way < DSfcT). which ; r»c i udea sc i ent * f i c s n t p | 1 > gence , 
electronic ; n t e 5 i i genre c EL I N T ) . Lie ve 1 onmen r » pr o i e r t s 
Division. Data Processing Staff. ar:o the Foreign Missile and 
■ Space Ana f ysi s Center . < Liqueur , 55 jtul P ; che \ son . ?<* 7, Tnouuh
-.Initially, the group. Technical Services nivision, which 
*executed all technical research ana development concerning CIA 
.Clandestine activities *. was left out of DS&T unr ! i \ Q ?:< when 
: it wa s renamed the Office of Technic** Ser* ices <L-»dueu» . 5b 5 
Presently, the DS&T includes the Office of Pesearch and 
Development, the Office of Development ann Englneer1 no. the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FRI3), the Office of 
Signal Intelligence < S r GINT >. NPIC. and O T S . c J o h n s o n . 42)
The activity of DS&T involves the research and development 
of "technical devices used in the intelligence process as well 
as the operation of technicological systems used in collecting 
and processing information" and it "also covers the analysis of 
information as to what Is happening in the science and 
technological arena in foreign countries." It undertook these 
activities by making use of "outside expertise and tit} 
developed its new systems through outside c o n t r act i no," Some of 
its major past achievements include the KH-li spy satellite* the 
U-2 reconnaissance plane, the SR~?t Blackbird spy plane, and the 
"senior f>uby" ELINT system. Also, the CIA, via DS&T. pioneered 
computer security measures, The overall focus of the 
directorate was and still is on Soviet military, s p a c e , 
ant I -ba )1i st i c missile and nuclear rr5 ss i I e capability and 
technology, The common denominator which DS&T analyses and 
monitors is the transfer of technology from the IKS, to other 
nations, tLaqueur, 56-61 and 66)
Essentially, a technology transfer is a "free exchange of 
ideas vital to scientific disc o v e r y " , which academies and 
professional groups frequently conduct. The IKS. relies heavily 
on its technological edge for its military capability ana 
national economy. ’‘Gradually, it has become clear that other 
nations have been buying or stealing technological secrets from
the U.S." Ideas, techniques, and hardware have been 
’transferred*1 in these manners and affected both the private and 
par>\ic sectors. Efforts to curb such a flow of technology draws 
close scrutiny by specialists with DS&T. The directorate is 
not responsible for enforcing U.S. regulations or laws; however, 
it plays *' a key roi e in providing enforcement agencies with 
leads as to where violations are occurring,*' Much of today s 
techno logy transfer is done legally through commercial or 
industrial means. Vet, it is this technology w h ;ch can 
!nadvertent1y lead to better weapons systems (i.e., computers 
for tanks, propellers for submarines). A classic example is the 
Soviet nuclear ballistic missile, designated the SS~i8. Some of 
the technology utilized in this missile was stolen at a trade, 
show from Hewl et t-Packer d in IQ T2. ( Liqueur , arid 66-67)
Past scientific and terhnn1 n o i c a ! assistance of covert 
operations have ranged from the bizarre to the fictional 
a p y - n o v e 1 type. For example. DS&T encased a unisonous pi i) 
inside of a hollow silver dollar for U-2 pilot, Francis Gary 
Powers, to ingest upon his capture. Other activities include 
constructing hollow rocks and trees for agent “ drop-zones'* 
placing sensing equipment, and developing many of the aaencies 
computer programs. There are two examples of operations wnich 
were both unusual and unsuccessfu1. The first included the
construct ion of a mechan i ca 1 condor that was supposed Hi fly 
over Lai i n Amer ica t a* i no phot riQnaphsj ho’-^vpr • i t crashed i n 
tee: flights and was abandoned. The other operation took place 
due t na the Vietnam War and i n v o ; ved di sppns inn a chemical agent 
on the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail which was supposed to make it 
Impassable and extra slippery. Needless to say, the chemical 
did not w n r . (Johnson, 47)
The J990s will be a decade even more dependent nn 
t echno 1 nov . Fiver y t h i no f r orr. the S1 e \ i ♦ n f i ah r r t o co i ! dren ' s 
education Is touched in some wiy oy science v:d t e c h n o ! ociy , It 
has become vital for America to maintain its technol0 9 ioal 
preeminence, Scientific and t echno i og i ca i Intel licence wi M  
con t i nue to play a cr u cI al role in A m e r l e a s  na tional e c o n o m !c 
pos i t. i on • millt ar y st r engt h m a  over a i i secur I r y .
Targets for the )990s wi i i oe si mi ;ar to t nose of the 
previous necades, The .Soviet Union will remain as A m e r i c a  s top 
technological threat. As P i chard on u ! t 7 says, "Over the past 
two'decades, the Kremlin has used its security ana Intel \ > pence 
serv i ces gu l t e effectively in acqu i ring West er n sc i en t i f i c 
know! edge and techno) nqy . *' These “ acqu i s I t I o n o “ have 
contributed to Soviet, advances in both their i nnust r ? a * 
military developmental programs (i.e., the SS-18, et.ai.^ 
Defectors from the Soviet Union commented on how 'technical
■.r'qt/isi r inn is * m=, .or element of the research -.nrt development 
Drones'! c o n r d i m t e d  oy ftneir) Mi i i f y - j ndusr r i 3 • Commission 
; V P K ). ■’ The Soviet Union w i n  continue to pu, sue ouch 
,tot ivitlf.s , especially i r; H y h t  of its own economic oowr, f . 
Desperate times may cause the Soviets 1 0 ,„,rt*rra*-e "desperate* 
m e a s u r e s . (G o d s o n , ]?S)
Other Possible targets could be .Ja„,n> Germany, tne 
European Community. South Korea. Taiwan, south Africa, .no the 
recover i ng Eastern European states. tlo eyuer-t nr academic nas
• .muUt*" men t «o.** o f  u ». » I i i r i u  !.',rc* * or i > k t  O'oyer t r* t j f~*** 
against such nations and allies. Ho w p v *, f in this 3rf»* the 
terms ally and enemy are more difficuIt to desi n n a t e . Amer i0 3 ' 
strongest a 1 iy could simultaneously oe its vntsr economic or 
t echnol on i ca 1 < o h .
Pichard Shuitn. among other experts, oeMey*. that the 
shouin utilize covert operations, if necessary, in the i m q u s  t n 
counter any such threat , Doing so v;j ; i riot only snub KfSK 
operations, but a : sn di scour u*e any fr iend.y acau i s i t i or-s1, ov 
America's allies. However, such activities wi » 1 r equ i re 
•' ] ncr e.iseri a v tent i on and gr eat re i rn^o \ n-a t i on t f f he »>. S . i s 1r-* 
survive in this ever grnwino technoloaica! world. <G n o s o n . .75
ana iBtn 
ISXX.QClm
Since the i^TOs there ha42? been a "growl no ride of political
t error i sm'’ ter ounhout r he wor 5 d, and by * he ; o r q  . • * >,m o  .*
“prime scourge ’ of international affairs. In *act, Pres i dent 
peagan Issued NSDD-138 which called for America ro - act i v e ! v “ 
respond aoainst terrorist groups. The jPQOs show no signs of 
t e» r or i sm abat i no on the loo-!; or i ritornat i ona I scene.
Terrorist afflicted areas include nations within Western Europe, 
tne Far Fast, Latin America, the Middle past , North Arner lea, 
Africa, and South America. Such groups have formed a “global 
a* ch i pc i 300 ( g ou t . -vws1' t h h t j « v p ,-*p c t * i r^ n< * he * :oc i e t \ ps wh * oh 
they are v i d e r c  . y ^t t.errtp.t i no- to nnaermi re . Most of these 
terrorist qr uupr a re ;i rn i - Or jrnrnu n i s t i n that t h e v d i sm i ss the 
'conventional (- ommu n i s t parties as nonrevolutionarle^ who work 
wdthin established not: \ a l st ructures,’* Furthermore, the ona I of 
many terrorist or oups j to create a society Without an 
est -sb I * shrr.cn t t arm the lt t h i nk [ pg does no f art her . ' Hnuson .
188 and ?X)6 ana Posit I M - i i O )
cs ter r nr j sm became an i nter nat i on* \ threat to allies ann 
the U.S.. the FBI < interna:) arid the CIA (external) were 
accord!nalv assigned their counterterrorist roles,
(Breckinridge. IBB) The CIA af1dr,s s ,, terrorism in two 
a i rector a t es . Fit or , t he Di rest or a r of I n t e i < i genre enu r * [ no
a s p e c t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  and t he  O f f i c e  o f  G lo b a l  I s s u e r  
cOOI )  v i a  O s  C e n t e r  f o r  I n s u r g e n c y .  I n s t a b i l i t y ,  and T e r r o r i s m /
C P i c h e { s o n , 2H ) S e c o n d l y ,  r^i* U i r er: t n r  a ? e n (  Oper^ t  M.;ns h 
c o u n t e r  t e r r o r  i st. s t a f f .  ( J o h n s o n ,  *46 > i t  1 s  p o s s  i n ! e f o r  
i n te  : i i gence a aem: i e s  t o  d e f e a t  t h e s e  t e r r o r  i s t  s , a s  everr.n ■ i * \ 
oy th e  s u c c e s s f u l  “ dec imat i on o f  t h e . , ,  Bader-M e i n o o f  Ganq- at 
th e  hand** o f  E u ro p e a n  s e c u r i t y  and i n t e i  } jaenoe f o r c e s ,  
t B r  eck \ n r  i dae . \ 90 ) However , combs t 1 ng t h i s  ! s c o u rg e  • j ^ n n ^
t h a t  s im p  i e . and p r n o ! erns s»ich a•:>, oa t n e r  i no s u *  f j c j ^ ri f
Intel » ioence on terrorist or nuns and coordinat inn a lin : £ ,s m n i f i ed
domes t i c o r I n t e r  r» a t i o n a 1 a r  t i t  e r  r  o r  is * r o r C V . Of > e , ;; or a nn
often hamper America s anility to combat ?ne terror it;;, 
(Godson, !B8 and Posjtyke, !.!/:>
threat .
There are not many examples of counterterrorist r
JPerati ons
over t h e  l a s t  two decades. One in p a r t  let.  iar i s  whp»r, n 
military planes forced an Egyptian let that was car ry j r
t error' 1 st s t o i and in If a 1 V . where 11 a i an -jut hor i t |
into custody , (Godson. 2 fit her uoerat * or;s inc»■ ! ur
\ r a  i ft!  e g  ; n o  : g e n  ex ; s  r*i.>un t e r ' t  f * r  r o r  ; n  f f  nr  o i ‘ -\ , .a‘a w i * ;  ^ r .
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arm rfoiona! conrrtirm inn“ br.tw *»cn stite natron.,
various terrorist organizations. Shultz believes that ln the 
logos American interests in the Middle F.a«> will ' i em ,. r. 
unchanged, aria the region wj ; , oontinue to evper ; er.ne various 
terms n< nrnt r a c t  ed st r u n o ; e . j nn i nd i no ter rot : on . " j. 
responding, the U.S. wi i i have to cs'l on at 1 degrees ot- 
St a t eer a 11 . C Godson . ! ft":. -a n: j l ftft- l ftH)
The entire continent of Africa will continue t o e  p i agueo 
with tsoclai misery, po I 11 i era l uncertainty, ar.rj genera' chaos. 
Terrorism couid debilitate any country in the regions however. 
Shu i t v oe i i eves that Kenya is, one nation in uar f i eo i at that
con } ci oe st ruck hy this ‘ sconrae" . The* c o u n f ry , v i t h i * s 
fr-tOi u* economy, relies ori triur i c:rn for the i r y of it s
national income, Terrorist r s rou in threaten \ts continued 
economic arowth political future. Therefore, the U.5*. nmnci
covertly assist Kenya, and any other African nation, in 
preven t » no such :% oa i art*> r v . < n ncison ♦ ; (K' >
Keep i no terrorism at oav j r * other parts o* * h** vre in will
help prevent i r from r each * no* Amer 1 ca s own shores. The above 
list nf tar net areas is by no means come] ere, tor no * a r. i or. ; s 
completely b3fe f t om terrorist at;tar> , Future U.S. over t ano 
cover t cotin t er t er r or i st art [ v i t I es must i nc 1 ude t he en t ire vor 1 o
riot -ijst key K e a u .  Anpf must t a* e an offensive st urce : n
cor oaf i ng t hese i nt ernat i ona 1 outlaws, or their a: ch i ne ) aaos of 
terror w« M  expand. Means of preempt i na or sr r i * i na -it rhe 
terrorists include covert counter terrorist operations, overt 
mi -1 I tat y options, unified domestic and Internal jonai • nne^ro ve 
diplomacy1’ against rerroist sponsors and organizer ions, ann 
International cooperation with nation s threatened ov t ft c or i •*»*» 
( Godson . ! 09*- ! 9fj)
Grua Xr^i firK l m j
In I960, the White House first raised international d'*up 
t raf f ! vM 1 no to a h i oh priority issue. The GIA , m  1 
primarily charged the Directorate of Intelligence, via -he 
Office of Global Issues (later, the Hi rent or at*.* n f Oper 
via its counternarco? i cs staff) r.n collect foreign i n \ P , nf»nre 
on and Htidf ess this prod 1 eir». < Johnson » 4b m o  P i i:h»»;  ^ . .,,- '■> t it  t * ■ r  .:■■
Since then, the CIA. in over a dozen countr ies, has 
occassi ona M y  assisted the N.S. Drug Fnforreme? t Agencv ( r,^ ; rvy 
identifying specific drug t r at f i ck ers # ana *he;i *oor at or ; .
t c-r*nssh i proen i points. and couriers. *oi ev.-»r,r ►*, ^
1960s. a CIA official -~'t at ; nnrd ; r, Southeast As; n , cb 
opium fact rjf y u an Hr ea c - !! ed the Go 1 den ?r i a no ‘ r,.. ,
Burma. and northern Thai! arid and Laos). He informed tf>e
^u t hor 1 1 1 e s , and only after t a  i nu the n 11 i on - s rh i e f C1 * Un , , r.^
- • '
(j ■: ■>
t o the site did the domestic authorities move to destroy it*
< Ros] tr>:e ♦ H  n~ 11 1 )
£ dr  • y i n t h e  N i x o n  Actm; n j s t  r  at i o n ,  t h e  C I A  w a s  o r d e r e d  nv  
m e  p r e s i d e n t  t o v i n o r  o u r ; ! y o u r s g e  t f i t  e !  ! i oeru^e e H  nt * V? t n 
i d e n t i t y  f o r e  I or: s o u r c e s  of  d r u g s  and t h e  f o r e i g n  o r a a n  1 z  ■'* * * 
and m e t h o d s  u s e d  t o  1 n t r  oduce. 11 1 t e s t  u r u q s  \ *« t o  t o e  > .n 1 t »*d 
S t a t e s .1 T h e  * ey p r i o r i t y  w a s  t o  " d e s t r o y  t h e  t r a f t i r w I n g  
t h r o u g h  » aw en t o r c e m e n  t and i n t e i U  n e n o e  e t f o r  t r >. ' I n  1 oTt1 • 1 
agency a s s i s t e d  t h e  B u r e a u  o f  N a r c o t i c s  ann H a n g e r o u s  D r u d ^
< BN HD) with an t nvest 1 na t i on into corruption of that 
organisation. In the course of this operation, the HI A
*jfe%3fceru I ted and trained nineteen agents over two and a half year
8tfit
KBS
* ie program was subsequently terminated i n  1973 due to the OCT ^
f-x Object ■ on of the CIA undertaking law enforcement activities’- -1
slip ’
:'-y$! ear v i o i a ; ion of its ! f?4~' char *er . ( Fa i n . 3f>4 and 2vfi >
Later i n ! d/y t the CIA confine t erl * eoun r er nar cot i cs 
L§ygperation with trie purpose of attempting to 1 dent i f v drug
lyV ;■ Sfl:
t r a f f i c k e r s  by monitoring conversations between the N.S. ana
IH4,.
-XL'''
i n Ameri c a . A 1 though t he o p e r a 1 1on prov i ded v a 1uan ie 
Information, it was cancelled three months uitet ov the Carter =»! 
i:?r?v:'>;^Counse1 . Who felt it was an \ t eya I activity, c Fa i n . 288 >
IPIItirirs> • *“i A‘ • ' .
The i^BOs saw even greater overt efforts put 4ort n to 








staff within the operations directorate assisted in collecting 
intelligence for the DEA, the Coast Guard and the Bureau for 
InternationaI Narcotics Matters CINM). The U .S.created the 
office of Drug Czar, in an effort to centralize this information 
and utilize it to •'identify potential problems before they 






Over the years, many rumors and stories ha\.e surfaced 
alleging that the CIA, members of the CIA, or assets of the CIA 
were involved in drug trafficking. For example, allegations 
have been made that CIA officials in Indochina during the 1960s 
were assisting the heroin drug lords of the Go 1 den Triangle, and 
at times, these officials were trafficking the drugs themselves, 
l o i t e r  Alfred McCoy accused the agency of creating Ha generation
)fk ? , ' 5 ' • ‘ ■
fi-df junkies." Yet. during thus time period, the CIA had issued
1 : '''UW ■ Mir.' ■ ?'■■■': : V . ' "'V';;-. . .'V r.:r. T.i', I'l.. • . .. •/.'•I
^ s t r i c t  anti-contraband regulations” , in an effort to clear its
name. However, the allegations remained that the agency was
■ ir
[f^lnuggl i ng heroin to H generate profits to finance covert
erat ions or to secure the cooperation of the Meo chiefs.” 
ter on* the C I A s  inspector general issued the CIA s air 
tietarles a ‘’clean bill of h ealth” and the Church Committee 













The same *) t eg*t \ ons were furtneren *a**nst official4?! 
wot kina in Afghanistan durir-i the 1 g$ntj with the mu < a h e d e e u . 
Supposed! y , these officials assisted the re**» Sf *r«ce i n smuggiing 
tne drugs for money. E ^ ^ n t  i a ] :y r he nr r >r» <: em is not with t he 
agency, rather ; t i s w d  * . tg r,ff ;r ; v<'- ...j assets. The r'\A
neve, d m  o r  doe*; it nsv t. ;r g  g;yne :d  :ts
emnloyees m  aoents ?:.mht have; -,W k c i  , m e  .,ue y:v does : !t :v> 
Uay Cnfdnr,,* nr e r e u M  .*mr SUCh ^rt i .» * t. ;e.,. { Johnson ,
slat cot • cs t rat t i ck i nn ;■ s usua \ ) v not -m i ssi?e I n wn oh 
covert operarions would ne considered, see m o  as such a c t ;one 
*r* unprecedented. However. in I ioht nf rhe r„,i y P ,P anoino
J. T ? tUf ^  ,lf th" over the M m  two deletes. new j n t i a ^
T » u e t  be explored. According to Hugh Tovar . the situations in 
■ drug producing regions of South America Southeast A * U  .
# T n  ° « Jy deteriorate moreso as theoe n a t i o n s  "moral fibers" 
x e  corroded away by the obscene .,.:o.jr,t., d . >j0 Win,,V-
ircotics traffic* ir.q poses an ever, g r bate, rh a ; enue to America 
ifl the JOWOs. Tovar del Seven h o :  r ,.,,, . ; „ np ..{(). v f . n„,
3.S. din not consider m e  ..se >>f covert ;p. m i i i t i - v
t ions to combat this problem <r n„w ;<.v#>! % (o n o s o n . ?fl6,
ifiii
U ‘U ■:. -
Part IV
A JFiiiM „6iiicLys i g
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A r  e U .3 , r o v e r  t o p e r a t  « on«i n o r  -a , ! v a or* e r n ; c?,., ! \ v n o r  r e e f
ana sho u  i d r roy c o n t i n u e  to he U n i ^ d  as a v i ^o • n ♦ o r e  ion
eve thation 1 icy O p t i o n ?  Cr d i e  -v of M O d , , 1 , c n v r r t ope r a  t :Of! ‘o ne f
t n «• rr iA ; s ’Tit!; n tiiipr i nr i p iHfl n r n  \ * n a h e (*■ ■ r t ; * ‘ * ‘J |> 1i ¥ , \
a ae ^ r v is =! '* r OQ- j f* r 1 erih a e t . 1 Th k» .:e •'>ppr'nR■ s \ i f *1' d I
f'l i f-t r ** ntjht o . r jn * i .t • O h * H . * r> r h *■* ; n.* t : : in : 1 tju :? ••,
mo? .i *■;f h fidar rra of * r: h A!],p * 1 i ' •' a * ' ? : i d ; »■ . , . . r S I , i J f ! . i 1* h v;i f j
h e . i e r  m t e w  nur ne c o v e r  r n n f ‘ -- i t ; n » , s  h e w *  t ?■ c - w  , r  »-• ; w w  A r rw r  ; .■• *, r 
pr | rie I P I es and I dea i s ” , -e, r j we #-* r» s u c h  act ; v • ? *»s -if e e v  n o s e r t , 
t h e v  <?f?f w H j s i y  h a m a a e  A m e r i c a  s  i r*1 p i  o.-it ! nr»a » rv  e r t  • o  I * i t v  v a 'i
rnor a 1 a n d  e t h  i oa 1 ! e a d e r  s h  ip  t h r o e  an o ' < * * he v/nr : a ,  1 c pa j r. t iaop
a n a  l e t  e v e ?  * 10 • : ; >
i f i o s  p o i n t  t o  h i s t  o r  y a s  r e v e a l  i n q t h e  rn i s o  i v ■ n o s  of
c o v e r  t o p e r a t i o n s ,  T h e y  e s p o u s e  thwf r n v r ?  t: , iet  « v i t i »>•-! j h
i o c e i t j f !  c a t  i o n s  h a v e  f r et jue  n t iy e v a c e r o a t e d  a p e n c e  i vf*d t h r e a t  
t o  Amer i r . i  s  n ) i  i o n . h  s o r u t  : t /  ( • *$ ; r> c.'uat e:n d ,  a n d  i f, t h e  
e n o ,  s u c h  a c t  i v ; i ; e s  h a v e  o n l y  c y  e a t  e n  t i e s  t o nor  n i p t  » e a t m e s
Of d i e t  i t  or e P w meh et " , r  , ! h afit j ? he Ah f: f t!: i  * c
 ^h e  P  , »»,  u fi u o  t ? e 1? on  ce w i t h '.»u t r h  v <*. i t i i h j t ft e H i t  * i f * ? (! t s j $ > ? ■ *
^rtt i on , ( f* a ! n , ) w e  t ?wr m? u r  , <W':UfW!cnts fie - ; h v h  t h a t  ccrw*r
operations, a n d  for that matter*, a ! t n i  America *? Intel l inence
eonares?ionai cnncetns: rather, such activities have been 
n } r ec t ert by i n d ; v i tju a s . w h «i:
subscribe to the belief that the survival of the nation (or 
freedom or .democracy, or ail of these) depends s < an i f i c a n t ]y or 
their actions. Secrecy* combined with such notions, has led 
intei 1 ipence officials to strain the bo.mns of wh a t rruaht n e 
cons I dered eth i c a 1 conduct . ( F,a j r. G 6 4 )
Over the last, forty-three years, mane fame*' n n v c  r^  ent
{'I t f 1 n ; n i *"! h • 1 Ve exp-ressen toe] r rjisp'eas. m e  over Ame r 11car s. use o f
covet t appear i o n s . For e>: amp I e , ■ a n e a r ‘'! c r . t ] r c > ♦ c : 'indus* * *»
and cover t ae M v  i r i e« -was Hen ry St uTisori who j r: ! w v q commented •
"Gentlemen no n o t read each other s mail At th-it t i me , he \
made his statement in reference to a secret decodino project the 
U .S . was conduct i ng aciainst v-ar jous other nat i o n s . Hovev?rr*•cbp: 
Is the Idea behind his statement wh i ch cr ! t i cs of cover r act ; one- 
C 1ing to, iBrecki nr iooe, ? H 7 )
The idea is that the U.S., be I no the world's preeminent
i i t ary , soc i a i , pa lit} ca 1 , ana ecunom i c \ e ader , shoo i d se t a
IHlSiia?ir ;■:%? .1%  ;;S;P 'mcf .U ; ■ . m  ■ . "i. 1. r; 1;: - 5 -a'-pa'V o m;-.K
m>m l l m : :m^: cv r . . :i <; ; Q m  .c: ;.?:/ / ;. m .■:c m m
example for the rest of the world, Georae Keenan,
-’I ?■-V
'.i
-m: mi.nm. ■ • ' ■ ?----■ '' .V V' .P ■ ’
m&i thou oh an avia supporter of covert opera* inn*’ trnm i,4'' tn
*
z 0 # 4 8 t concurred with this not • on that , America s ‘first
£kv
jtQlSM i Qa t i on “ .-I*-; ,i wor |rf leader }«; to ‘set a anno e v ample. . . t o be 
teacher for ail human i ty . ‘ Also, Arner i ra " i s no p i ace ter 
i covert } operations,0 said he * u U  does not fit our 
;>mational character.0 Furthermore. Kerman '.entitled before the
71
C h u r c h  Commi t  r p ^  s t  a t. i no  t h a t  t h e  1J , V .  w ' » 1 h-» ve n o;  t* 
i ts t  he w o r  • cl n v  be i n o  h o n e s t  t h a n  by f o l  i nw i n g t r e  f a n c y  
f c n v p r  t  1 f r i e z e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  1 f , /Onns r . m , C U V - P s ' *nf l
A n o t h e r  e v a n p l e  i s  f o r m e r  s e c r e t a r y  ° t  d e f e n s e , C l a r k  
C- i f  f o r  of, wno t e s t  j t i e d  b e f o r e  C o n g e e s s  * n * '* • ^ t h a t  , " c o v e r t
a c t i o n  w a s  not  i n t e n d e d  t o  oeeome f t  h e > p e r v a s i v e  f  n r  e j an p o i i C  
t oo : , " t n .i i ; t n c ■;. P f i r mer  u nde f  '- inc r e t ,-i r  V' o f  s  t a? e a n d At  I op ne  
( »ener  a • , N* i c  h o 1 as  K 3 t : > * n o a ; ‘h , f  ut  t n  e r e s p o u s e d  t h a t  t h e  d . S  * 
c h n u  i o i t »anoon n u b ,  i o '• y i l ; c o v e r  t o n e r  ♦ t i o n s  o p s  •■ o p e n  t o  
i n f  ] u e n c e  po I i t  i ca I r  e s u  i t s  i n  ♦ o r e  : on t r o u n t  r  l e s . . .  f and  t na t ; } 
we s h o u l d  con f i n e  o u r  c o v e r  t a c t  ' y ; t  j e s  o v e r s e a s  t o  t h e  
g a t h e r ! ng o f  i n t p i ] i q e n c e  i n f  o r ma t i o n . "  <. F a i  n , 6 6 M a n d  6 8 V )
J t m  W r i g h t ,  f o r m e r  S p e a k e r  o f  m e  H o u s e ,  ey p r  M«js»»rj  h i * *  
d i s p l e a s u r e  w i t h  c o v e r t  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  s t a t i n g .  ” ! do n o t  t h i n k  
we h a v e  any  c a l l  t o  a p p o i n t  o u r s e l v e s  a s  C o d ' s  a v e n o i  n o  a n g e l s » 
B|vn , a n d  t o  r e f o r m  by  f o r c e  [ c o v e r t  a c t i o n s }  g o v e r n m e n t s  w i t h  w h o se
. 7 7 '.v .77 7;v " 7 •: ' 7 ' 7. v :.;7 "V '.7 v .7.
p o l i c i e s  we d i  s .- jo re e  . " c J o h n  so? . ) Mn f t p f M a n n e r  i n ,  ♦
gfe;^ :s . •. ...
v f fV fo r m e r  NSC s t a f f  m e m b e r ,  s t a t e d  t h a t  c o v e r t  o p e r a t i o n s ,
a r e  i n c o mp a t  in' ,  e w i t h  o u r  d H rn o c r.it  = r  i n s r  : t u t 1 o n s .  w i m  
^ C o n g r e s s  i on a 1 a n a  pu h  * i c co n  t r o } o v e r  t  oi  e 1 gn po  : i cy dec I s  i o n e  . 
l-TWi t h  o u r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  - ~ i o h t s ,  .-mu w i t h  m e  o r  i no i n 1 -*nr1
v ' ' 1 I d e a l s  t h a t  t h i s  P e  o u b  l : r  s  t  a r; d s  f  n r J r, tn.. war Id. t-If'-nrisa',.
i. H a r r  y p o S  1 !
* 7 k e , h i  c i t 1 c  1 ^ e o
or; e t : t t h o *
r r 1! s o f A r^r* f' J f% , ^
- t- h e s  t r a n d f‘*
■ i  r  ri d  I a s  t e t u X
s r-*rr;p 1 a , » i  ! t
! i:j ? r *pr , Ar- c o t r i : n o  *.fj
Artier t c a n a s t - ^  %  \ ‘ Al 5 ! i e i J i t s e ; f
•a* —e rsr>-  p a r  ? V O ; i O ^ r i O  e s  , * 'e o c u  ;
cC  a r j M S  , w h »■*, : *•■ F* ; : , ,
Cj.i  pj ; S  t ‘ o . c p rc n r - 'f - - ' ' , . - ;^ o  rr,_>rt*r  r - h s.
r e n e u . u j e - i .  ! - • ’ t . i r » *
t
“w i t.h. t h e  ''non~C*vnrum  i s t  t m , wor o - n : ' * t o y Mint 10
c i v i U a n  dirt n o ^  s, one-party a r- r 
reaI p>r?s ; n their termini '; 
a 1 v  *? y s  r i^ * pp n r  t e rj " i  r  t ; - Con; 
e x  ' \ e q  p o i t \ a : , p  *r i y
ernl a r e s . 1 ( Poo 5 r ::*< e , yoo j
He a . s o  e ^ i t i c i r e a  r h e  C I A  f o r  ,yi t r t-rrp t * o rj r f  t r"^ | Jfl ►  j*
p r o m i n e n t  wor I d Most t- '-me? - r i n  do* r»*r-» •] «.* , -of
■4^0  c i t i z e n s  <-»qree t h a t  a s s e s s i  r»a r i on i s  i m n o r a l  a n a  w r i e t h i c * *  
f n  f a c t  . most c r i f i e s  a n d  a a v m  • i  r e - ; of  i':r>VM' i oner  i * j
‘ ' 1 ' • 1; 5 j *"<>.-■  ,-■ - ■ * *■iO;^ S r . „I A V / A - w  dw' ,, . ;dd'v -:.v.":'r -;-vV .1 oddd. j; d:.d\ ida-dd ;; •- - .vk^'-n' d ,d :V'-: I.';,':y ■;"■.■
as^&ssJ nat * on tor any purpose is wrono ana should he
dd'dd'w C||d
ip.eo, as H  presently is. Positske. in his nnno*mnat iar;;'
dd ■.,'. ed:\4d-'d -d\ ;. Y dddY.,..d|d:dd:.ddd ;'->i; d'CSO' dd ’ X&idR- ;•'.• • Yd>;d dd'dir - yd . ddpYdddd d Vf ■•'V . ^ -.:Ir i
t y ra n n ic id e -, th e  “murder bf a d ic t a t o r  by o^tT :'
jfyd y'ov- • r •. : y ■ ' ' • • ^ . • *• y-
* which he does not condone; rather , he th*^
f‘M'tsio:n u p  to the cl r icens of t hat country, Huvf*Vf^  ^
Iftong \ y objects to U.S. i nvoi cement i r. soon at*.;■ ‘ *' * r o . He
it ts' ’ tha t a nation wh 1 oh ttee * des t o a s s a o s ; n a *«. a f or e i on :
for it s own i n t nr pot o : o "*no pro .i rr-i
;* y
impot ent , Furthermore, he or i t * c i ses Amer '» c a 's invoi vem*r,t
Tru i s I in s 1 n a t i on , because the Arner i c -m onver orient
encouraged the group to "remove" Trujillo, understood i tgs
inr ent 1nns . '-ind provided t h e we a p a nc *; wn i e of f iC 1 3  ? i V
d i ssoci a t ir i o itself f rom a n y 1 n v o 1v e m e n t . H i s  cone 1 us i on i s
t. n a t t h e I ; . S . m.'iv as we l 1 have puI 1 ert t he t r | goet' wh i eh i . i- * • ■ ■ t i ! rji f-j
t h e Dorn i n ir:* a n 1e a d e r . Fi t h e r va y , assess net ion i s  immoral
u p e ^  i ca i . a no mug t n e  j e r  he u t i l i z e d  in r r - e r  t o n e r  ar i nn<?. 
c Pf >s i t rk  e> , r n O  - ; > u i  :
H o w e v e r , w h i l e t  h e e r  1 t i os' do ha ve  some s o u n d  'ar oum»-r t g ( i r
pr or* i e r r s  w i t h c o v e r t  one r a t ! £ 3 r  s  , *T>e»: . f ' C '■* i 1 y u e r  t a i r ; no t o
o p e r a t io n  a 1 s i s e .  sc o p e  and o ver a ! 1 p O I i e y . P r o p o n e n t s  n f
c o v e r t o p e r a t t n n s  w h n le h e a r t e d !  v n i g i o r  ee w i t h t h: e i r ar  i'iunpf] t o
that such activities are immoral and unet hioa! instruments \ r 
Amer ica s a i p i oma t |c arse rial .
Many covert operations advocates would say that Jim Wrioht 
was correct in his statement that we are not vGod's avenging 
angels." Humans are in no way, shape or form angels, and this 
fact a 1 one f proponents argue, is exactly why America needs to
retain its capa&iiity to conduct 
fault whicn suupor t »•*»■«: <sf covert
covert operations. The main 
oper a t i or;s i i no w i r h t. he
opponent s arguments is that these critics du not view the vor ;rj
re-3 ! i st i cu Not one •non w o u l d  r e * wor 1 ft i fi wh i e h
there was no ev|:, no deception, not oetraya Howe vet' , the
r e a ; wor » d possesses these Chirac tec ;st iro. Furr;,nr nr;, wii:iam
Co : r»y , in his testimony before the Church Comm : t r ee , 5usr j f i erj 
covert ope: at ions in that, ,
there are many risks and dangers associated with cover? 
action. . , But we must, live in the* wor 1 n we f- , nrj, nr,t rhetor >0 
we might wish. Our adversaries deny themsei nr. f ormc. *
act. ion which might .advance thru interests or urdercut our s 
In many parts of the world a prohibition on our use of covert* 
■notion would put the U.S. and those wno r^iv nn ; » ,»act
dangerous di s-*dvant age . . . Therefore. . . covert -«c: ; 
a b a n d o n e d .  ( J o h n s o n .  C u >
or. cannot oe
According to proponents, the C.S, must view the wgr *d *-eo* 
as a d « tee wn e r e " compel- it i on for i n « ‘ ue ». » ,. ,ir „ .
is a fact of ’ ifp." (Fain. 66^) Posi t r.ke e ] ^ g-nr at es further r>v 
st ft ! no thit toe WO! ;0 ; s nt ' m m  e pdw*»r i r; «.t priVF,f . more
annas a no i e«s noons, of greater secur i t y and : esser secut i t v . a 
world in wh i ch war ; s the final i mm or i it y . • ”'he n.ti nns aitt 
the most either conquer or destroy the lesser . Co the w o r ’d 
ar en -1 v i ewpoi nt m  ■• nt neat one of cnmpet i t j nrj Mljt m u rv 1 va . 
Therefore, nations in this arena inevitably pledge themseives to 
the pr anrna t i r mo 11 o : " Ba d 1 s be 11 er t h a n dead.” ( Ros i t 2 * * • 20<5 > 
This reaipolitik system, in which "there are relatively 
recogn i red and no enforceable i nt ernat i nnai ws" . is pytr^meiy 
difficult for not only the oritiCs of covert action, out 
Americans in gen^rai. to accent, Wh i i r the c.;C v not w-cd to
jkmiM',. .. . .■ , . . ,
cornpe t e. in this va y , the f=»ct \ ^  tru^ t every n a t i on on giooe
cioes. l-,c'l V l n  Philips, a  termer CIn of t i c  j a  1 , me I - eve*} t ^ . l t  
m^k i no the U.S. e ; irni nate i t s cover t opt i orts voc 1 d oe fv^rc i no t * 
to compete . n t od-i y s world arena " h i  i *iafn J den '* n ri f w * ^  ^  
hand tled behind its back." (Phil; p s . 2^6 and 2"?H)
Proponent s a ] so refer to the H Just W * r ,: Tneor y , wp ; dh 
defines the proper rnor si relationship between military force and 
po i i f i c a i t esponsj o i ; i tv, Tr arri t'i fin h 1 ' y ,?rjp i i pn t n m : : : r y 
a° lxt r  Dn t  *ir * n n s  * however . t he concep r can re late t o for- fi an 
pf , ,  it,:v ny  p r o v  i a* r ig a " nv :r  > ■ y a r n s ?  . r r  f o r ’ a s s e - 's  1 no  t o , ,
.< n e t  n e e t a r  ? i g h t n e s s  o f  i ? : t e ]  ; '.oe.n •■■*■* rape: i t . n n s .  llpr-jf,? * h ; S  
» 0(»| ;* ' ‘ . ■ v*' ■' e r r . i ► ; v i ‘ ■ eo : }-»»> co^- 'o :.?»■ r~ et * r'-i C i  : O ;*
,e ** r, •* - i re  \iSt , ! h m Hri:‘]|ci t r e ■; - t i h b  t e e  rn)f*» -i * ;
v  : 1 ;[ ..’: a d v a  n:Oe t,fie c a u ^ ;d  sec t ;  f i t y , * u s t  ■ oe "»Tv j
freedom," <Let e v e r . 14 and IB)
On another farret nf morality, the advocates counter the 
critic, s moral i r y argument . by contending that the II, B, j s- 
pressured by the world to maintain its mor a 1 preemi nence . A ? s o « 
Pt oponents claim that the only way the U.S, can maintain this 
status is by protecting Itself from all types of of overt and 
Covert threats, via all possible means including covert 
operations. Essentially, this argument creates a nouroe 
standard: m  that, the world accepts the use of covert
oppt-5r i ons hy Amei :»:a 's ent*m****’ •,nc* ’ ^ *‘r' • f--rir5f*r'" !iSf‘
of m e m .  Therefore the argument l» that while ‘he world w 0i,, rt
foroe the u.S. t u l emu ; r; 1 Mr Mor a ; i t y " y.an,d set ■ir>‘ ey $mp i e f or
the Sov lets ana other nation c i ,  the U.S, wn» j Id wind up
a no i r itino fits nr ru»rn i pen re 1; t  (' tfiO’jc Whu do firl eMen Sn f f Of
f r om a uu 1 ’ l y ;:o;>Sc 1 era r • r t h 1 o a r e 51 . 1 f f «("i r . 66 Q >
■ "'A,1 j 11 f the >f O flUT; | *■” pf r * r 1 te '} n t h c - . f * f * t ‘f’V ' P ^ : rci ■
n v e r a * pr =»oi:i it i o appi ufich * o  for ei cn poi :cv and the use of
cover t t.’iper ^  i : nns , Throuaho n t hi story, fhe U .S . h*s over r tV
intervened in the affairs of ot^e r r:at ions r hrough mi i i tar y and
econom \ o a i d , and pr opuaanrta i nst fiimen tf5\u. In evchance for t h e s e
:i a  i ft?" < hr i bes ) , the other c ou n tr j es von Id re! Jnquisn such
th I nas as base or por t -of ~ca! i riohts or pol it ira! cooperat ] on * 
A; l at these e> a m p } es -*re cons i der ed normal and accept a b « e 
act ivi t ten between nat ions. The advocates evtrapoiate this 
arQuoient to include covert subsidisations or Support of for e i dr. 
nifties, lanor unions, security forces, etc.
< pOS : t " K f» . 20 4 ~ P}0 Is, 5 t k ~ •
,ne ioq;c behind the aroumerd ,s -h^f if
U.S, covert cioer u  Inrm
‘c r ^  conne»nned for "mertd i n g K \ n other
nation s affairs, ►he-
-<■ b o  vou;n Arr(e t ica s entire for elan oniicv.
Both overt and cnve-e
~* 4 n "  i v * »c o  h a y
i n  t e r  na i a f f a i r s  o r  *•,
■‘e,o, country. and to condemn
e profound i M p r r c  -)r> rnr*
n ofie\; .t v b e :
A tixiA 1 po i 'st em» m m  a ! . ? y j <&• r o i sert 11 >’ ^OC: i t r>e . wn o
disputes the or U  It: s r 1 a i rn that Amer i c* ^ n;i 1 *-1 s e ‘: ’ bot ‘5 i
example fur the rest of the world. He states that Americans 
urnf e^^ -no extol rrnr i i s ar»d et h i os which they no not p o g s e s o .
? n ana : yz i ng Amer i can mor ale. sever a I que^t nn^ *r e ra j serf t o
;• : | h i  s  *>o I n r .  Ho •-;? a t e a n d  = o r  « I 1 f' v e  ’ *a r ’ f u> ; v e r  n m e o  t.
o n e ?  l i t e o n  moral p r  i n o  ; p i e g ?  Hoe*-- u ^ s  i new*- t h * i v m  on h o n e s t  /
.^o o open '»p s k  At ** 1 . ; A-Tier i c - t n s  rnor a l and et h i o-»r ■* Wh -d enou t
dorr tars? lawyers? Cor per at e £xecut i ves? 2a • ’ t :: t a no? perhaps 
A m e r  . c a n s  de* - i n n  mot *» r ; f  : h e i r  f o r e  i o n  n n  1 i c y  u r d  t h o i l  
in t e i i i pence agencies than they demand of themselves.
< Pos 1 r z fc e , 2 0 6 ) A famous man once said, I-et t he one .-i-'nono you 
who has not sinned cast the first stone. ' r^aybe Amer i cans 
sh nu in r ec<an s I de r and r ee v a I u a t. e the 1 r own rnor a I s a n d e r n \ os 
r»etore udg i no t hose of t ne wor 1 rt.
A former U.o. senator once said that, ' every ^resident . . . 
vi l l turn t to covert act lor to ie degree or another . 1 < Johnson,
260 > The last forty three years of U.o. covert act ion have 
proven the validity of this statement. Kven Jnnmy Carter 
eventually resorted to covert operations a g a i n s t  the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. This statement seems to accurately predict the
p - i , r. t ^  .... Tn utj i 'f. r:i:vf*r* op#*:' .„■* r : <:| s 5*5 mcril :
ar,n ethics- ! n'-.rrum^nt-1 nf A.wr j, , ,orf,.,.n !JO ; r.v _
m s ,a f i f.J insiysi-s, I developed * set of frnjr sjmo;** 
or i i 'T i a upon which the vUPiiity .in a nrerrt ;c*>:ty nf i ■ fu-ur« 
U.S. coves r operations can r.>e evaluated and ...udaed. The first, 
rt , r cf i r’ri is moral irv. A propo-aert covert operation should 
onnsi<ie> America s morals and ethics ana then apniv m e m  r,, 
mat n if f i cu • <r ac t * v : t y , If t he pr r»f.;\ neiyf .inn n i s aov ! qnr o . 
a i on<? with the Conyrea*. have no rrtotai or ethical qual-ns ui th a 
spec i f * c oper a f t un , t hen i t shuu ; a o.^ss i h )s t r r : r e-o 
However. if there do exist cnr^r ns then there j no pnlnt in 
going through v/ith the act . The 11. H . shnu} a never rnndurt an 
operation, such as an assassination, wi t n wh i oh it cannot 
tost i f y its national morals and e t h i r* s .
The second criterion is secrecy. If a covert operation is 
so secret that only a few people Know of its existence, then the
operat 1 on shou 1 a not r>e approved. This ru i e espee j a ) 1 y app l \ es 
if one of the few in formed people is not the president or anv 
other key official: as was the situation, for example, in the 
lrancontra Affair, where the president (et . t;.; riid not Know n{
the diversion of funds from the sales of arms to Iran. On the 
other hand though, a covert operation should not hf* approver, if 
the U.S*. cannot maintain plausible deni ability. Without
*r?n *he n p p f i ' i o n  : ^ r.D ; o n " » r  c o v e r t  out  o v e r • . A n !  one 
e*amp:e of "imp ,n.si nie* «jen i ar>: I 5 * V * - Pe icj.^ n s iptie^ m  r n»* 
America-; pub! i r? f nr •J.nvi>rr  funding of the Nicaraguan contras.
The th i ro C r  \ , : ors : <- ^hor * t er m oh >M<:r \ ves. This t pot i
very simple. If * rrovert operat ion can satisfy* the government ,
*ahOf t t erm nb ior.f j '.X»«! ( j . e .. f :in arc;no a fore: or? pr? it 1 r: i o i
ry Oi.ist i no a o i f •fO n r  ? he*; i t sho,To be appr overt, . T f. . T..he o?c
i r ■ ; v i t y Cevorof therj of cnur s**, ] f . ohou 1O xjfr* r e tec * ex}, p{.j j" f: p
short t erm ex amp 1es are the ! CO*,if*? t oper at' i ons cohdv c t e d i r?
Goat ema t a -inn ! \ tp* j ^  t pe ear l y !
The f i na 5 or i r er i on In i orvT f enn ou f comes. Th i s t est » o 
more d ; f f 1 ru , t ro sat i of v pen v.se !1 at t empt s to ana * v **e the 
f lit tir e nij t corres of a cover t opera t ion v » a the foi ‘owing 
quest i ons: What internal a f feet (s > will the cr?ver t aroivitv
have on the target nation?. How wi 1 1 the operation affect the 
target nation s region? f What affect will the activity m t ? »♦ «: 
results have on the U.S.. the current administratIon, and the 
American public?. Will the operation and ‘o? \ t s r r*su ; r <s affect
U.S. credibi1ity?, and How will Americas a ’lies and enemies 
react tu the cover * action a n a its results?
If the answers to these questions satisfy American officials 
then the opera M o n  should be approved. Covert. 1 v suooot t i nc
['gmupn and o r g a n i s t  ions in Western
r*yi-mp; i t 1 es covet t '"me rat i on with -»“*
Europe during the late 1^4
t1 sf ae1 or y ; ong t **rm cid•* ,*«? ■ :
*no nut comes.
A c r w a i n *  to my moriei, * H  tour criteria must nr* s a t i s f i ^ .
It ;t rover t nperat ,nn tn be pr*or ‘^ * 3nd ,pt»
failure to satisfy even one of the criterion shot; la e i i m * n * t e 
the operation immediately. However. * * an opera t ion is conducted 
under these terms it will assuredly tai : . at reast in the 
uns -it i sf i ed area, if not ail the o t h c r s because of it*-; 
unsatisfactory condition.
We need an intel!ipence community that . in certain 
complicated si tuat ions, can [morally * nd ethically} defend the 
American national interest in the gray areas where military 
operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate, 
t J o h n s o n ,'3?>
This statement made by former secretary of state and
nat i on a 1 security aov i ser , Henry K i os 1 r.ger , adept 1 y sums up th i s 
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